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Statement of Facts 
1) On or about May 18,2005, Appellant executed a Note and Deed of Trust (hereinafter 
DOT) in favor of Appellee Lehman Brothers Bank which listed Appellee MERS as nominee for 
Lehman Brothers Bank. 
2) On or about December 3,2009, Appellee Quality Loan Services mailed a "Notice of 
Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust" to Appellant (Record at 15-16). The Notice 
further alleged that MERS was the beneficiary and Nominee for Lehman Brothers Bank under 
the DOT and further purported to designate Pioneer Lender Trustee Services as Trustee and 
Pioneer Loan Services as Successor Trustee and Attorney in Fact. 
3) In response, Appellant filed an action seeking Declaratory and Injunctive Relief with 
the First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County on April 1, 2010. (Record at 1-28). 
4) The request for a Temporary Injunction was denied by the District Judge on April 7, 
2010, however the parties submitted a stipulation for cancellation of the sale pending suit on 
May 6, 2010m later reduced to judgment, which remained in full force and effect until the 
Court's judgment on January 24, 201 I. 
5) In her Complaint, Appellant alleged that the actual owner of the note had not been 
established, and that MERS lacked standing to foreclose. Thereafter, Appellant was given leave 
to amend her Complaint. On June 10,2010, she filed an amended Complaint adding allegation of 
fraud. 
6) All defendants joined in the filing of a Motion to Dismiss filed on April 27, 2010. The 
motion was granted by the District Court pursuant to a Ruling on November 16,2010, and a final 
judgment was entered on January 24,2011. Three days before the Court's judgment on January 
7 
24,2011, and without the required notices, Appellees sold Appellant's home at foreclosure sale 
on January 21,2011 in violation of the order restraining the sale. 1 
7) The Court's judgment of January 24, 2011 is the subject of this appeal. 
Issues Presented On Appeal 
1) Wnether the District Court erred in converting the Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment before discovery enabled Appellant to acquire information to resist 
the Motion. 
2) Whether the District Court erred in finding that Appellees had standing to foreclose. 
3) Whether the District Court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of disputed 
fact? 
4) Whether the District Court erred in accepting hearsay testimony from opposing counsel 
via affidavit? 
5) Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney fees and costs? 
1 The contest over the wrongful foreclosure arising out of the defective sale is not the subject of this appeal, as 
Appellant did not learn of it until well after the lower court's judgment. Appellant is currently embroiled in an 
unlawful detainer action, despite the pendency of this appeal. 
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Argument 
Assignment of Error #1: Did the District Court err in converting the Motion to Dismiss to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment before discovery enabled Appellant to acquire information to 
resist the Motion? 
The Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief was filed on April 1, 2010 and 
served shortly thereafter. (Record at 1-31). A Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 
was filed by all Defendants on April 27, 2010, 26 days later (although the motion lists its 
date of preparation as March 22,2010,9 days before suit was instituted by Appellant). 
(Record at 32). 
Thereafter, Appellant was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, which was 
subsequently filed on June 10, 2010 (Record at 10 1). All arguments in this appeal are based 
on the Amended Complaint, and the Court's decision relating to the allegations in that 
complaint. 
Careful review of the Complaint reveals that Appellant alleged a lack of standing on the 
part of all Appellees, due to lack of proper assignment of the Deed of Trust, or lack of 
ownership interest in the note. (Record at 101-122). Her allegations are tied to the fact that 
her Deed of Trust, and/or the note which it secured were subjected to a process called 
securitization. \Vbile this appeal turns solely on the proper construction of Idaho law, it is not 
possible for an informed decision to be reached without some basic understanding of how the 
securitization process effectively destroys the long standing foundation of property law in 
9 
this State 2. Without full discovery at the district court level, those facts could never be 
brought to light. 
Repeatedly, Appellant asked the District Court to postpone decision on the Motion to 
Dismiss to permit her to obtain facts in discovery which are solely in the Appellees 
possession. (Record at 128 and 141) (Transcript at 23, 28, 29). Appellant submits it is 
manifestly unjust to permit one party to manipulate the outcome of a lawsuit in such a way as 
to deprive the other party of a full and fair opportunity to develop and present their case. 
Accepting the district court's suggestion that all plaintiffs must "have the evidence ready to 
prove this lawsuit. " (Transcript at 32, 11. 23-24, 3611. 18-22), discovery would never be 
appropriate. If that observation were legally sound, few if any plaintiffs could prevail absent 
evidence garnered from the opposing side during discovery. Rarely is it possible for any 
plaintiff to have all evidence from the other parties at the time of inception of suit. Instead, 
by filing a Motion to Dismiss immediately after service, then attaching self serving affidavits 
and documentation, Appellees created an untenable situation in which Appellant had no 
meaningful opportunity to obtain the proof she needed in which to prove her case. Given that 
Idaho law permits a Motion to Dismiss to be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
1. R. C. P. 12 (b), by filing the original motion quickly, and then adding additional documents 
to covert the motion, discovery can be averted. Indeed, one must wonder if the preparation 
date of the Motion to Dismiss, March 22,2010, before Appellant even filed suit, suggests it 
is standard for banking entities to utilize advance prepared pleadings to implement this 
2 Professor Peterson is one of the most noted authorities on property and consumer law particularly as it relates to 
MERS and its progress through the courts, see "Two Faces: Demystitying the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System's Land Title Theory" http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1684729 See also 
http://www.iaw.utah.edu/facultv/facllltv-profilei?id=christopher-oeterson 
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strategy? The Court may find some guidance on this issue in the decision of Judge Magner, 
in In Re: Wilson, (Bankr.E.D.La., 2011) Case 07-11862. In awarding sanctions against LPS, 
she noted: 
The fraud perpetrated on the Court, Debtors, and trustee would be shocking if this Court 
had less experience concerning the conduct of mortgage servicers. One too many times, 
this Court has been witness to the shoddy practices and sloppy accountings of the 
mortgage service industry. With each revelation, one hopes that the bottom of the barrel 
has been reached and that the industry will self correct. Sadly, this does not appear to be 
reality. This case is one example of why their conduct comes at a high cost to the system 
and debtors. 
Id at 25-26. 
Judge Magner's ruling was partially in response to her sheer exasperation by the bank's 
refusal to provide documents which resulted in 10 discovery disputes in which the bank 
repeatedly attempted to keep the court from learning the real facts. 
Rule 56(f) LR.C.P. allows the District Court discretion to refuse a motion for summary 
judgment or to continue its hearing if it appears that the party resisting the motion cannot provide 
affidavits or documents to resist the motion, to permit discovery or it "may make such other 
order as is just." Despite repeated pleas from Appellant, the District Court insisted on deciding 
the motion without full fledged discovery. Appellant submits that this order was manifestly 
unjust when discovery would have uncovered precisely the facts she needed not only to resist the 
motion, but to prevail on the merits. Instead, Appellees implemented a procedure designed to 
insure her failure, and regrettably, it was approved by the Court. Appellant was faced with an 
impossible burden. Once the Motion for Summary judgment was filed, it was her duty to respond 
with specific affidavits, depositions or other competent evidence, Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 
86,867 P.2d 960 (Idaho, 1994). Without discovery, this burden could not be met. Appellant 
attempted to engage in discovery during the pendency of the motion for summary judgment, but 
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with little success in obtaining meaningful information, and no time was allotted for a motion to 
compel. (Transcript at 60,11.15-25,61,11.1-4). While the District Judge ruled on the motion for 
reconsideration that he had repeatedly postponed hearings to permit discovery, (Record at 196), 
the only references in the record are to the contrary, (Transcript at 60, 11.15-25, 61, 11.1-4) 
(Transcript at 32, 11. 23-24, 3611. 18-22). Appellant submits that Idaho law requires a litigant be 
permitted to have full, meaningful discovery before their case is wrongfully aborted during 
motion practice, Merrifield v. Arave, 128 Idaho 306, 912 P.2d 674 (Idaho App., 1996). How 
could the district court have been in a position to construe the evidence liberally in favor of 
Appellant, when the most telling and relevant evidence had yet to be uncovered during 
discovery? See, Ackerman v. Bonneville County, ]40 Idaho 307, 92 P.3d 557 (Idaho App., 2004). 
Appellant submits that the Appellees quickly filed a Motion to Dismiss in this matter in the 
hopes that they would never have to disclose their improper activities, much like the banks in In 
Re Wilson, supra. Resistance to discovery by US Bank in a loan modification challenge was the 
subject of much more pointed censure in Phillips v. US Bank, Superior Court of Carroll County 
Georgia, Case CV 00504 (November 2,2011) (Courtesy Copy attached). In short, there is a 
consistent practice on the part of lenders and substitute trustees to rush to foreclosure before their 
wrongful practices can be uncovered by formal discovery. 
Similarly, discovery would have permitted Appellant to derive competent evidence 
susceptible of being introduced into evidence that MERS admits it does not designate the real 
beneficiary in foreclosures until after the trustee's sale, which at one time was listed on their 
website, but now gone. Clearly, designation of a phantom beneficiary for purposes of foreclosure 
is a fact which is quite relevant to disposition of this suit. Moreover, it blatantly contradicts the 
repeated assertions of Appellees that all parties listed in the documents filed of record were the 
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proper parties to foreclose under Idaho law. Yet, without sworn depositions, Appellant could not 
provide this information in the form of admissible evidence. 
Assignment of Error # 2: Did the District Court err in concluding Appellees had standing to 
foreclose? 
The District Court, in essence, declined to address the issue of Appellees' standing to 
foreclose. The reasoning applied by the District Court presents an irreconcilable conflict on this 
issue. The Court indicated that it lacked the authority to create state or federal law and that it was 
up to federal appellate courts to resolve the issue. Conversely, the Court found that two Idaho 
federal bankruptcy opinions In Re Wilhelm 407 B.R. 392 (2009) and In Re Sheridan, 1 I.B.C.R. 
24,2009 WL 631355, were not binding on the Court, even though they both construed Idaho 
property law. It is hard to imagine how the court could conclude that federal law applied, then 
refuse to consider two federal bankruptcy decisions originating in Idaho. 
If ever there were an issue which is not the subject of conflict in the federal court system, 
it would be the issue of standing. In order to properly present a claim the person seeking redress 
must have suffered an actual injury at the hands of the opponent which can be addressed by the 
entry of judgment, DaimlerChrysler Corp. et al v. Cuno, et al. 547. U.S. 332,126 S. Ct. 1854, 
164 L. Ed. 589 (2006). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has spoken directly to the 
issue before this Court in a long line of cases which dictate that a litigant has standing to assert 
their own rights, but lacks standing to assert the rights of another, except for narrowly defined 
exceptions not applicable here, See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 140 L. Ed 
575 (1998); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,96 S. Ct. 2968,49 L. Ed 2d 826(1976); Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031,97 L. Ed 1586 (1953). Nor is there a conflict between this 
well developed body of jurisprudence and the current law relating to standing in Idaho. 
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Standing is a threshold issue. Lack of standing may not be waived and may be 
considered by the court sua sponte. Christian v. Mason, 219 P. 3d 473 (Idaho, 2009) 
In Christian, supra, the court noted: "Jurisdictional issues, such as standing, and the 
interpretation of statutory language that confers standing are questions of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. See St. Luke's Reg. Med Ctr. v. Bd O(Comm'rs, 146 Idaho 753, 
755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 
(2009)." 
These same principles were recently reiterated in Martin v. Camas County, 
Number 33605, (Idaho 2011) which stated: 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue, not an adjudicative fact of which the court may take 
judicial notice. 
Id at 5. 
Even if not binding on this Court, Appellant submits that the most persuasive case law 
relating to this appeal is to be found in the two decisions construing Idaho's law relating to 
enforcement of notes and deeds of trust, In Re Wilhelm, supra and In Re Sheridan, supra, and in 
a partiCUlarly well reasoned district court opinion from Minedoka County, Ralph v. MET Life 
Home Loans, Number 20100-0200 (courtesy copy attached). The Ralph decision relied on both 
Sheridan, supra and Wilhelm, supra along with a very soundly reasoned case from Oregon, 
Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. 2011 WL 2119103 (D. Or. May 25,2011). At the 
time of preparation of this brief, Appellant believes Ralph is still in the district court, and appeal 
delays have not lapsed. She is uncertain of the status of appeal in Hooker. 
While there is a lengthy discussion in the opinion of Judge Haines concerning who may 
be a beneficiary under the Act, the decision does not address the issue raised by Appellant his 
pleadings: did any of the named Appellees have an interest in the note, not just the mortgage, 
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such that any of them had standing to prosecute. Appellant submits that mere invocation of the 
tenn "beneficiary" is not enough to establish the legal authority to fulfill the legal requirements 
of that term. As so thoughtfully expressed in Armacost v. HSBC Bank, 1 O-CV -274 EL T -LMB 
(District Court Idaho 2011)(Courtesy Copy attached) "One could not reasonably contend that 
compliance with a procedure gives substansive rights not otherwise possessed" Id at 21. 
To date, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, in two separate 
opinions, rejected the alleged authority of MERS. The first was the matter of In Re Sheridan, 
Case No. 08-20381-TLM (Opinion issued March 12,2009). In analyzing the real party in interest 
requirements and the alleged "beneficiary" status of MERS in the Deed of Trust, the Sheridan 
court expressly rejected MERS' self-appointed designation as "beneficiary" in view of its 
declared status of "solely as nominee", and found that the securitized mortgage loan trust and its 
"trustee" had no interest in the Note or the Deed of Trust. The Court also found that there was no 
language in the Note giving MERS any rights whatsoever. The Court found that there were 
disputed factual issues as to who was the holder of the Note. 
Later, the Idaho Bankruptcy Court went further in addressing the infirmities as to MERS 
in the matter of In Re Wilhelm, supra. In Wilhelm (as here), the Deeds of Trust named MERS as 
the alleged "beneficiary", but also stated that MERS was "solely as nominee" and that MERS 
held "only legal title". The Bankruptcy Court found that the Deeds of Trust did not state that 
MERS was authorized to transfer the promissory notes, but that nevertheless the movants in four 
of the five cases discussed in the opinion submitted assignments in which MERS purported to 
assign the Deed of Trust "together with" the note. 
In again rejecting the alleged authority of MERS, the Wilhelm court noted that the 
moving parties "seem to presume that the assignments, standing alone, entitle them to enforce 
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the underlying notes". The Court found this assumption to be "unfounded", as the "nominal 
beneficiary" language in the Deeds of Trust did not, "either expressly or by implication", 
authorize MERS to transfer the promissory notes. The court premised its evaluation of standing 
based upon the clear provisions of Article 3 of Idaho's enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code governing negotiable instruments. See Idaho Code § 28-3-102(a); id. § 28-3-104(1). In 
other words, to decide the issue of standing, the Bankruptcy Court was required to evaluate 
Idaho law, not federal. 
The Wilhelm Court cited Saxon Mortgage Services v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2009 WL 531057 (Mo. Ct. App. 
March 3, 2009) in support of its position. These cases, as well as the Wilhelm decision, as will be 
seen later, reflect the numerous courts throughout the United States which, like Sheridan and 
Wilhelm, have resoundingly rejected MERS' purported authority to do anything. 
Appellant still maintains the [mdings by the Court in Sheridan and Wilhelm 
represent the current state of the law in Idaho as to the lack of authority on the part of MERS to 
effect foreclosures. Significantly, the conclusions reached in those cases have been repeated in 
multiple jurisdictions around the United States. 
Perhaps to fully understand the issues before this Court, it would be helpful to understand 
what MERS is, and how their business operates. These facts were not fully before the District 
Court because discovery never transpired, and it is not possible for this Court to consider if the 
grant of summary judgment was proper without understanding what facts will be uncovered in 
that process. While the Deed of Trust lists MERS as the "beneficiary" on the security 
instrument, and as "nominee" for the lender, those are essentially empty words inserted to 
suggest a patina of authority to act in the foreclosure process. Nothing in the record before this 
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Court shows that MERS owned the note, had any interest in the Deed of Trust other than its own, 
superficial, self serving declarations that is holds those interests. Instead, there is ample case law 
reflecting that MERS is due no monies from Appellant for payments on the note, is not entitled 
to receive any monies from that source and never held any actual authority to execute upon the 
Deed of Trust. By comparison, the Court should consider MERS own forceful denials of its 
functions arising out of the following line of cases. 
MERS operational structure was clearly described by the Supreme Courts of Kansas and 
Nebraska and the Court of Appeals of New York (New York's highest court): 
"MERS is a private corporation that administers the MERS System, a national 
electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing 
rights in mortgage loans. Through the MERS system, MERS becomes the 
Mortgagee of record for participating members through assignment of the 
Member's interests to MERS. MERS is listed as the grantee in the official 
records maintained at country register of deeds offices. The lenders retain 
the promissory notes. as well as the servicing rights to the mortgages. The 
lenders can then sell these interests to investors without having to record 
the transaction in the public record. MERS is compensated for its services 
through fees charged to participating members." 
Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kessler, 216 P.3d '58, 164 (Kan. 2009)(emphasis supplied), citing 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Banking & Finance, 704 
N.W.2d 784, 785 (Neb. 2005) (in which MERS forcefully disclaimed a beneficiary'S rights in 
order to avoid payment of fees by registering as a business entity.) 
"In 1993, members of the real estate mortgage industry created MERS, an 
electronic registration system for mortgages. Its purpose is to streamline the 
mortgage process by eliminating the need to prepare and record paper 
assignments of mortgage, as had been done for hundreds of years. To 
accomplish this goal, MERS acts as nominee and as mortgagee of record 
for its members nationwide and appoints itself nominee, as mortgagee, 
for its members' successors and assigns, thereby remaining nominal 
mortgagee of record no matter how many times loan servicing, or the 
mortgage itself, may be transferred. MERS hopes to register every 
residential and commercial home loan nationwide on its electronic system." 
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Merscorp, inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81,86 (N.Y. 2006). 
Similarly, in scrutinizing the operational standing of MERS against the standard MERS 
language in a mortgage document, the Court in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
v. Johnston, Docket No. 420-6-09-Rdcv (2009), conducted a thorough examination of the current 
law as to MERS. The Court began by first examining the definition of "nominee" from Black's 
Law Dictionary, 1076 (8th Edition, 2004). Black's states: "a person designated to act in place of 
another in a very limited way" a.fld as "a party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others 
and distributes funds for the benefit of others". Legal title is defined as "a title that evidences 
apparent ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficial 
interest", Black's Law Dictionary at 1523. This is in contrast to "equitable title", which is "a title 
that indicates a beneficial interest in property and gives the holder the right to acquire formal 
legal title", the Court noted. 
Johnston, supra, held that the mortgage deed consistently referred to MERS "solely as a 
nominee" and that it holds "only legal title", but it then purported to expand MERS' authority as 
a "nominee" to act as in essence an agent or power-of-attorney to carry out the rights of the 
lender, including foreclosure and sale of the property. The court held that this purported 
expansion of authority was restricted to that "necessary to comply with law or custom", and that, 
importantly, MERS and the lender purposely chose to use the specific legal term "nominee" and 
not "agent" or "power of attorney", and that MERS chose to defme the term "nominee". Further, 
the court observed that the mortgage deed consistently referred to the Lender's rights to the 
property, and not MERS', lending additional credence to the conclusion that MERS had only 
limited authority to act "solely as nominee". 
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Against this backdrop of established decisional law and admissions of MERS, the 
Vermont court held that MERS could not enforce the underlying obligation, and may not enforce 
the mortgage deed it holds in its name with only "bare legal title". Appellees in this case have 
acknowledged the presence of this same MERS language in Appellant's Deed of Trust the 
should force a similar result in finding MERS lack of authority to foreclose as in Johnston, 
supra. 
The Vermont court was further persuaded by the Nebraska Dept. of Banking & Finance, 
supra where affIrmative representations were made by MERS that: 
(a) it does not acquire mortgage loans because it only holds bare legal title in a nominee 
capacity; 
(b) it is contractually prohibited from exercising any rights with respect to the 
mortgages, i.e. foreclosure, without the authorization of its members; 
(c) it does not own the promissory notes secured by the mortgages and has no rights to 
payments on the notes; and 
(d) it does not take applications, underwrite loans, make decisions on whether to extend 
credit, collect mortgage payments, hold escrows for taxes and insurance, or provide any loan 
servicing functions whatsoever. iUERS merely tracks the ownership of the lien and is paid for its 
services through membership fees charged to its members, concluding that MERS does not 
acquire "any loan or extension of credit secured by a lien on real property", and that MERS 
"does not itself extend credit or acquire rights to receive payments on mortgage loans; that the 
lenders retain the promissory notes and servicing rights to the mortgage, while MERS acquires 
legal title to the mortgage for recordation purposes. " 
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The Vennont court went on to note that counsel for MERS in Kessler, supra "explicitly 
declined to demonstrate to the trial court a tangible interest in the mortgage", citing the case at 
Kessler, supra at 167, and that the Kansas court found that MERS had no stake in the outcome of 
an independent action for foreclosure, as it did not lend money, nor was anyone involved in the 
case required to pay MERS any money. The Kessler, supra court concluded by holding that "If 
MERS is only the mortgagee, without ownership of the mortgage instrument, it does not have an 
enforceable right", adding that while the note is essential, the mortgage itself is only "an 
incident" to the note. 
The Vennont court, expounding further on the holding of the Kessler decision which 
itself noted what MERS argued to the Nebraska Supreme Court, found that MERS was not 
authorized engage in practices that it would make it a party to either the enforcement of 
mortgages or the transfer of mortgages. The Vennont court also noted that MERS and the lender 
intentionally split the obligation and the mortgage deed, and held that MERS lacked standing to 
bring a foreclosure action in its own name, or as "nominee" on behalf of the lender. 
The Court of Common Pleas for the State of South Carolina in the matter of Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Girdvainis,. Civil Action No. 2005-CP-43-0278 (Jan. 20, 
2006) also held MERS to its representations previously made to the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
as to its non-ownership of the promissory notes; not extending any credit; not having any 
independent right to collect on any debt because MERS did not extend any credit and that the 
mortgage debtor does not owe MERS any money; etc. and held that since MERS prevailed in the 
Nebraska litigation, MERS was "judicially estopped to disavow the positions it advanced during 
the litigation process in Nebraska or avoid the [mdings and conclusions articulated by the 
Nebraska court." 
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The South Carolina court, citing the caveat on MERS' authority by MERS' own contract, 
held that the representation as to the assignment of the note and mortgage to MERS "for valuable 
consideration" was "diametrically opposed to the way MERS operates". The operative language 
in the MERS contract to which the Girdvainis, supra court refers is that within MERS' own 
contract which it has with its lenders and servicers, which specifically limits MERS' authority as 
to mortgage loans and properties the subject thereof: 
MERS shall have no rights whatsoever as to any payments made on account of such 
mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to such mortgage loans, or any mortgaged 
properties securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any rights with respect to 
such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties. 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada in the matter of In re 
Joshua and Stephanie Mitchell, Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR (Decision of August 19, 2008), 
in analyzing what MERS stated it was according to its own website; the testimony of the 
Secretary of MERS; and the definition of "beneficiary" from Black's Law Dictionary 165 (8th 
Edition 2004, the same as that used by the Vermont Court), held that "MERS is not a beneficiary 
as it had no rights whatsoever to any payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties 
secured by the loans." The COlli1: cited the same MERS "Terms ai1d Conditions" set forth in 
MERS v. Girdvainis_, supra decision from 2006. 
Indeed, counsel for MERS in this case openly admitted that MERS did 
" ... not claim that they own the loan. There is no evidence that MERS does make this 
claim. And, we specifically deny that. " (Transcript at 52) 
These are the earlier cases from Courts which first had the opportunity to review MERS 
authority to institute foreclosures. The trend has continued and expanded as Courts throughout 
the United States have insisted upon the enforcement of not only foreclosure statutes but 
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traditional concepts of property law. At this juncture, there is not yet controlling precedent in 
Idaho, and many of the extra territorial decisions are certainly persuasive and useful in assisting 
this Court in deciding the instant case. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rendered a compelling decision 
which has particular merit in disposing of the merits of this appeal. It demonstrates how the 
fraudulent title practices and improper record keeping of most major lending institutions is 
becoming legendary around the country. Even when pressed to gain quiet title for their own 
purposes in an action they brought, neither US Bank nor Wells Fargo could produce adequate 
documentation to win their own case, Us. Bank v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (Mass. 2011). This 
case is remarkably similar to Ibanez, supra in the pertinent legal aspects. In Ibanez, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to foreclose on the 
property of two sets of homeowners because they were unable to prove they had any actual 
interest in the mortgages via assignment before the foreclosure sale was completed. Here, 
Appellees have produced no documents which conclusively establish they held any legally sound 
interest in the original note executed by Appellant at the time of foreclosure. As Appellant set 
forth earlier, she is entitled to know that the person with proper standing to foreclose is doing so. 
A similar result was reached in Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Service, Inc. et al. 2011 WL 
2119103 (D. Or. May 25,2011). The Court found that the failure on the part of the foreclosing 
entities, a substitute trustee service, MERS, and Bank of America was not adequate to meet the 
threshold requirement of the Oregon Foreclosure Statute, ORS 86.705(1) that only the true 
beneficiary may act to foreclose. Of particular note, Judge Panner compelled the defendants to 
provide a "complete chain of title for the note and the deed of trust." Id at 3. As in Ibanez, 
supra, and here, the provided documents failed to establish any proper capacity for the 
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defendants to foreclose. However, unlike Hooker and Ibanez, supra, in this case the district court 
did not require production of a full chain of title, and proceeded to decision nonetheless, over the 
objection of Appellant (Transcript at 33 and 36). Apparently, MERS believes that by invoking 
the mantra of the status "nominee" it can defy the law, and expect the Courts to decline to 
enforce it. Nor has MERS argued the Idaho Foreclosure statute grants any authority to a 
"nominee" of the beneficiary. MERS has not made this argument because it cannot. Careful 
review of the entire Idaho Foreclosure Statute, Idaho Code 45 § 1502 et seq. reveals no powers 
or authority granted to any entities but beneficiaries or trustees. (Transcript at 57-58). 
While Appellant has given this Court a small sampling of the cases in which MERS was 
found not to have standing to foreclose due to its lack of status as beneficiary, they are only 
presented to assist the Court in seeing the rationale applied by other courts. In addition, they 
provide some historical perspective relating to the beginning phases of litigation challenging 
MERS ability to assert rights it does not have. The issues raised on this appeal are being 
furiously litigated throughout the United States, often with five or more new cases coming out 
each day. It is anticipated that Appellees will submit a significant number of cases in which 
Courts around the country have erroneously ruled MERS has standing. At the end of the day, no 
cases cited are more than perhaps persuasive because in Idaho, there are really only three cases 
which have addressed the issue: Sheridan, Wilhelm and Ralph, supra. 
Of great note, however, is the April 13, 2011 order of the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) requiring MERS and its member banks (which includes Lehman Brothers 
Bank) cease and desist from their foreclosure practices, stating: 
The Agencies have identified certain deficiencies and unsafe or unsound practices by MERS 
and MERSCORP that present financial, operational, compliance, legal and reputational risks 
to MERSCORP and MERS, and to the participating Members. Members are institutions that 
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use MERSCORP's and MERS' services and have agreed to abide by MERSCORP's Rules of 
Membership (the "Rules"). The Members include depository institutions regularly examined 
by, or subsidiaries or affiliates of depository institutions subject to examination by the OCC, 
the Board of Governors, the FDIC, the OTS, and other appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
as defined by subsection l(b)(1) of the Bank Service Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(1), 
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are subject to examination by the FHF A, 
(collectively "Examined Members"). 
http://wvvw.occ.govinews-issuancesinews-releasesi20 llinr-occ-20 11-4 7h.pdf 
This Order was rendered after the decision by the District Court in this matter, and so was 
not available for its consideration. Indeed, the law surrounding the issue of fraudulent 
foreclosure practices changes at mind numbing speed. Appellant anticipates that by the time of 
oral argument, she will have to request to supplement her listed authorities because there will be 
significant new developments by that time. 3 
Careful review of the record in this matter reveals the kinds of practices which the Order 
was designed to address. 
The Notice of Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust was filed into the 
Kootenai County records by Pioneer Lender Trustee Services purporting to be appointed by 
Quality Loan Services a supposed "duly appointed Successor Trustee" and further alleges that 
the deed was to secure "certain obligations in the amount of $345,000.00 in favor of MERS" 
(emphasis added). Record at 15. Yet, at oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, counsel for 
Appellees openly admitted to the Court that MERS had no interest in the note and that 
"MERS does not claim that they own the loan. There is no evidence that MERS does 
make this claim And, we specifically deny that. (Transcript at 52). 
3 An example of the frequency of change in this area of the law is best illustrated by the article contained 
at the following lin1e It came out just as Appellant was in the early phases of preparation of this brief, 
http://,,vww.nvtirnes.comi2011!OQ!02!business!us-is-set-to-sue-dozen-big-banks-over-
mortgages.html?pagewanted=2& r=l&emc=na. Within minutes, Appellant also obtained a very recent 
filing by the Attorney General of Arizona, challenging these same kinds of fraudulent practices before the 
Arizona courts. Less than one hour later, Appellant also received an Order from the US District Court for 
the District of Seattle certifying questions relating to MERS standing to foreclose to the Washington 
Supreme Court. It is difficult to overstate how quickly this area of the law moves. 
24 
\Vhile the Deed of Trust clearly states that Appellant has "obligations to MERS" in an 
amount equal to her loan, it is difficult to comprehend how she owes that obligation to a person 
or entity with no rights to the loan. Nor is it comprehensible that the Court can overlook the 
conflicting argument of counsel which directly contradicts the Deed of Trust, although the 
former is probably more accurate. (Record at 15). 
Instead, it is more likely that the allegations in Appellant's First Amended Complaint are 
correct, (Record at 39-46) and that the Deed of Trust was securitized and assigned separately 
from the note and that MERS is seeking to enforce a security device, the Deed of Trust, which 
has now been rendered invalid. It is certainly a factual inquiry necessary for resolution of this 
case. 
Indeed, Appellees' position flies in the face of firmly established law which 
requires that the note and the deed of trust be held by the same owner in order to be enforceable. 
The United States Supreme Court stated "The note and mortgage are inseparable; 
the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage 
with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity," Carpenter v. Longan 83 US 271,274, 
(1872) citing: Jackson v. Blodget, 5 Cowan, 205; Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johnson, 43. cited with 
approval in Hooker, supra. See also Armacost, supra. 
While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since Carpenter, 
supra there is a long, solid history of jurisprudence from around the country both before and 
after the 1872 ruling which holds that a mortgage and a debt cannot be separated. The mortgage 
without the note is unenforceable. See, Southerin v Mendum, 5 NH 420 1831 WL 1104, at PP 7 
(NH1831)); Merrittv.Bartholick,36NY44(NY, 1867); First Nat Bank v. Vagg, 65 Mont. 
34,212 P.509,511 (Mont. 1922); West v First Baptist Church/Taft, 123 TX 38871 S.W.2d 
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1090, 1098 (TX 1934); Denniston v C.IR., 37 B.T.A. 834, 1938 WL 373 (B.T.A. 1938); Hill v 
Favour 52AZ 561,84 P.2d 575 (Ariz 1938); Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal2d 179, 192246 P2d 23 
(1952); Kirby Lumber Corp v. Williams, 230 f2d 330,333 (5 th Cir. 1956); Trane Co. v. 
Wortham, 428 S.W.2d 417,419 (TX Civ. App, 1968); Barton v. Perryman, 577S.W.2d 596, 600 
(Ark,. 1979); In re AMSCO, Inc., 26 B.R. 358,361 (Bkrtcy.Conn., 1982); Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 
AD2d 537, 536 NYS2d 92 (2nd Dept., 1988); Yoi -Lee Realty Corp. v 17ih Street Realty 
Associates, 208 A.D.2d 185,626 N.Y.S.2d 61,64 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept,1995); In re BNT 
Terminals, Inc., 125 B.R. 963 Bankr.N.D. (Ill. 1990); In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc. 194 B.R. 
859859,861 (9 th Cir 1996); In re Bird, 2007 WL 2684265, at PP 2-4 (Bkrtcy.D.MD,2007); In 
Re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-ll (CA-201O). 
None of the Appellees have established by competent evidence that they are the current 
owners of the actual note and mortgage, which is an indispensible legal requirement before 1. C. § 
45:1502 et seq. can come into play. Yet, they ask this Court, as the one below, to overlook the 
law and instead accept their self declared labels without question. 
The many deficiencies in the foreclosure process were pointed out to the District 
Court, and apparently ignored. Yet, they persist in establishing the flaws in the foreclosure 
process. There is no evidence that the supposed "Assistant Vice President" Tara Donzella of 
Pioneer Trustee Lender Services had the knowledge or skill to evaluate the propriety of any 
assignments, nor that she made any effort to do so, (Record at 16, Transcript 62); see In Re 
Wilson, supra. Similarly, there is the possibility that the alleged notary on the same document, 
Michelle Nguyen, is probably the same person who is under a Cease and Desist Order from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for engaging in recordation practices which were 
"misleading." http://wvvw.sec.gov/litigation/adrnin/2009/34-59317.pdf. These are facts that could 
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be uncovered during discovery, had the motion not been granted. Appellant believes they are 
facts that Appellees do not want brought to light. (Transcript at 62). Indeed, these items were 
very carefully set forth in the Affidavits of Charles Homer, Forensic Auditor, and while accepted 
as an expert, the recording deficiencies he noted were ignored by the district court (Note Ref: 
Affidavit filed by L.J .E. on June 21, 2011, and Motion to Augment record name of doc: 
Examinations by Charles Homer (15t & 2nd Affidavits (with exhibits). (Record at 164) 
Under Idaho law, these are not idle inquiries. While it is generally presumed that a 
notary, operating in a position of public trust, discharges their duties properly, when it can be 
shown that 
" the notary conspires with a forger, or fails to require the personal appearance of the 
acknowledger, or is negligent in ascertaining the identity of the acknowledger, the 
statutory scheme is frustrated whether the form is completely filled in or not." 
In the Matter of New Concept Realty & Development, Inc. 692 P.2d 355, 107 Idaho 711 at 357 
(Idaho 1984), citing Farm Bureau Fin. Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 
514 (1980). The very integrity of the judicial system is called into question if sloppy or 
fraudulent recordation procedures are accepted by the Courts. 
Other similar deficiencies are readily apparent on the face of the documents which 
were filed of record, and argued at the district level. Tara Donzella was listed on the appointment 
of successor trustee as an Assistant Vice President ofMERS on November 30,2009, and the 
document was notarized by Michelle Nguyen on that same date. (Record at 52-60) The same 
day, Tara Donzella was listed again as an Assistant Vice President of Quality Loan Services and 
notary Nguyen again attested Ms. Donzella was the representative she stated she was.(Record at 
15) These facts are certainly suggestive of robo-signing as argued to the District Court, see In Re 
Wilson, supra. (Transcript at 61-64). 
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Given that MERS has confessed it has no interest in the note, that it does not own 
the note, and that none of the Appellees have shown by competent evidence a similar interest, it 
is clear that none of the Appellees are aggrieved in a manner to confer standing upon them to 
enforce the Deed of Trust as an incident to a debt owed, Carpenter, supra, Christian, supra. 
Appellees completely ignore this wealth of recent decisional law, including that from the 
state of Idaho, with its consistent findings and holdings negating any alleged authority of MERS 
to do anything other than electronically track mortgage loans. In fact, at trial counsel for MERS 
conceded its only function was . . . "simply a tracking system to help lenders track loans. " 
(Transcript at 54). By what legal principle does an electronic tracking service stand to assert 
rights to a note or deed of trust in which it has no interest? 
The long standing, firmly established law completely negates the entirety of Appellees' 
positions as to MERS and completely destroys the very foundation of Appellees' assertions. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the OCC would have sought to restrain MERS' practices in the 
presence of legally sound foreclosure procedures. 
Appellees' entire premise rests on the unfounded (and legally incorrect) assumption that 
MERS assigned the Deed of Trust and that simply because "MERS role was fully disclosed" that 
the alleged Assignment was legally proper. Appellees' assertions are not only unfounded, but 
have been expressly rejected in the law not only in Idaho but by a multitude of jurisdictions, both 
state and Federal, across the United States, with several of these jurisdictions relying in part for 
their decisions on the findings of the Idaho Federal Bankruptcy Court in the Wilhelm, supra, See 
Hooker, supra. 
Whether Appellees' allegedly "complied with" the Idaho foreclosure procedure is 
irrelevant to the inquiry and issues raised by the Complaint. Standing is a totally separate issue 
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and one which the Court cannot ignore, given its jurisdictional nature, Christian, supra. The real 
issue, which Appellees have ignored and continue to ignore, is whether they had any alleged 
authority to even undertake actions toward foreclosure. The decisional law of Idaho and 
numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States have patently held that MERS lacks the 
capacity to foreclose as a matter of law. To contend that a non-judicial foreclosure is not a taking 
of property under the dictates of the United States Constitution is highly improper. 
Assignment of Error # 3: Did the District Court Err in Concluding there were no genuine issues 
of material fact? 
The District Court, utilizing the standards for disposition of a motion for SlUYHnary judgment, 
concluded that the pleadings and exhibits showed no genuine issue of material fact, and that 
Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, citing, Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 
668,691 P. 2d 1283(Ct. App. 1984); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 896 ( (1984). 
There is patent error in this conclusion. Appellant's original and amended complaint contains 
extensive allegations concerning the overall securitization practices of MERS, which result in 
selling the mortgage and separating it from the underlying note which it secures. (Record at 39-
60 and Transcript at 61-64) Moreover, the complaint specifically states that the actual owner of 
the original note Appellant signed is unknown, and alleges that the ownership of the original note 
and Deed of Trust precludes Appellees, absent proof of ownership of the original note, from 
foreclosing until they can demonstrate full legal standing to do so. (Record at 1-20 and 37-60) 
Clearly, there are genuine issues of disputed facts, such as: 
1) Who currently owns the original note? 
2) Has ownership of the note been severed from ownership ofthe mortgage? 
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3) Does MERS or any defendant have any ownership interest in the note? 
4) If neither MERS nor any defendant have no ownership interest in the original note, can 
standing to foreclose exist? 
5) Were the documents signed by a robo-signer (declarant for hire), Tara Donzella? 
6) Was the notarization process fraudulent? 
7) Was the chain of title properly established sufficient to identify the owner of the note and 
actual beneficiary of the Deed of Trust? 
8) Did MERS deliberately purport to allege compliance with the Idaho Foreclosure statute 
without actually complying with traditional concepts of property law and rely instead on 
fabricated labels? 
No competent evidence was produced by any Appellees which establishes 
answers to the questions above. Appellant attempted to obtain this information via discovery, 
and was denied that opportunity, (Transcript at 60, 11.15-25, 61, 11.1-4) (Transcript at 32,11. 23-
24, 36 11. 18-22) Without establishing these critical facts, it is simply impossible to conclude 
that Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The arguments presented to the 
District Court raised genuine, unanswered facts, and are piercingly material to proper 
disposition. See Arygle, supra and Berg, supra. Moreover, the decision of the District Court 
impliedly suggests that rendition of a judgment "as a matter of law" could not have been 
appropriate if there was no settled law in Idaho which would have resolved the disputed facts. 
The opinion reflects that the Court refused to consider federal law which "this Court cannot 
address .... " (Record at 163). Appellees heavily contested not only the facts listed above, but 
also Appellant's right to raise them. (Transcript at 68-69) Regrettably, the District Court seemed 
unduly persuaded by Appellees' repeated reminders that her loan was not current, and refused to 
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evaluate the real, underlying issues in noting: "There are no genuine issues of material fact that 
Edwards has breached her agreement with Aurora by not making her monthly payments. " 
(Record at 163). Whether a homeowner is in default on a note is not a dispositive fact when the 
real issue is the standing of parties seeking to enforce rights they do not have. As Judge Panner 
thoughtfully and properly reasoned: 
While I recognize that plaintiffs have failed to make any 
payments on the note since September 2009, that failure does not 
permit defendants to violate Oregon law regulating non-judicial 
foreclosure. The Oregon Trust Deed Act "represents a well coordinated 
statutory scheme to protect grantors from the unauthorized foreclosure and wrongful sale 
of property, while at the same time providing creditors with a quick and efficient 
remedy against a defaulting grantor." Staffordshire Investments, 
Inc. v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 209 Or.App. 528, 542, 149 
P.3d 150, 157 (2006). 
Hooker, supra at 10. 
This Court should also note that the requirements of the Idaho Foreclosure Statute were 
not met. Idaho Code § 45-1502 (l) states: "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise 
designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in 
interest, and who shall not be the trustee. 
Furthem10re, Idaho Code § 45-1502 (4) - "Trustee" means a person to whom the legal title to real 
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
The Deed of Trust signed by Appellant states that: 
Page 2, Definition E: "MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS 
is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's 
successors and assigns. MERS is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument. 
Page 3: Transfer of Rights in the Property - "The beneficiary of this Security Instrument 
is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the 
successors and assigns ofMERS. ( ... ) 
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Page 3: "Together with all the improvements now or hereafter .... Borrower understands 
and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this 
Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as 
nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or 
all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclosure and sell the 
Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, 
releasing and canceling this Security Instrument. (Record at 80) 
Clearly, therefore, MERS cannot be both the beneficiary and the trustee. Even so, the language 
in the Deed of Trust patently declares they are claiming the status of both. To pose as both 
violates not only the statute itself, but also the obligation of trustees to operate by providing 
truthful information, not only to the trustor, but even more so to the courts, Diamond v. 
Sandpoint Title, 968 P. 2d 240,246, 132 Idaho 145 (Idaho 1998); Rehearing denied 1998. 
Counsel for MERS advised the trial court that MERS had no interest in the note, and specifically 
disclaimed that interest, yet the Deed of Trust states that MERS holds "legal title" meaning it 
stands as trustee under I.C 45-1502, while at the same time purporting to act as nominee for the 
beneficiary. (Transcript at 52) MERS cannot, under Idaho law be both the trustee, and the 
beneficiary'S representative for purposes offoreclosure. This dual capacity negates the propriety 
of the attempted foreclosure, Moreover, the language indicates that MERS is the "beneficiary of 
the security instrument", and has to power to assign that interest to its successors, which lends 
great force to Appellant's contention that MERS did in fact assign the Deed of Trust after 
separation from the note. 
A default on payment alone does not dispense with proper compliance with the 
legal requirements set forth in the Idaho Foreclosure Statute if a homeowner is to lose their 
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home; a fact that Appellees seem to hope this Court will ignore. See Hooker, supra, Armacost, 
supra. 
Even if the Deed of Trust is invalidated, the issue of non-payment remains alive 
on the note, the actual obligation itself. To lump the two together ignores the fact that they are 
two entirely separate legal creatures, even if tied together with a small thread allowing expedited 
enforcement. Failure to recognize this distinction has resulted in much muddled thinking and has 
caused homeowners around the country to be unlavvfully deprived of their rights. Invocation of 
the mantra "he just wants a free house" by attorneys for MERS has been invidiously prejudicial, 
often causing courts to turn a blind eye to other legal requirements. Invalidation of the Deed of 
Trust does not void the underlying note, absent other defenses. See Vanoski v. Thomson, 757 
P.2d 244, 114 Idaho 381 (Idaho App. 1988); Petition for Review denied, 1988; Ibanez, supra. 
See also Armacost v. HSBC Bank, 10-CV-274 ELT-LMB (United States District Court, District 
ofIdaho, 2011) (courtesy copy attached)(no objection was filed to the Magistrate's Report, and it 
became the order of the District Court) 
If for no other reason, Appellant submits that it is appropriate for the Court to 
require proof of the validity of the documents filed of record because this Court should be able to 
rely on the trut}l..fulness and accuracy of the county's system of recordation. Anything less risks a 
potential fraud upon not only Appellant, but also on this Court. It has long been the law in Idaho 
that documents reflecting claims to property may not be recorded by strangers to title, Maxwell et 
al. v. Twin Falls Canal, 292 P.2d 232, 49 Idaho 806 (1930). As cited above, Appellant alleged in 
her amended complaint and at oral argument that the recorded documents reflected fraudulent 
practices. Unfortunately, the District Court failed to heed its own reading of the law in finding 
that the Idaho Foreclosure Statute, IC 45-1505 et seq. required "recordation of all assignments" 
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while ignoring the patent discrepancies in those documents. (Record at 164). Appellant also 
deserves to know she will not be sued in the future by the real owner of the note, or sued for 
damages for failure to deliver clear title, should foreclosure eventually occur. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts addressed the harm arising out of 
improper foreclosures in Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, SJC-I0880 (Mass. 2011). In that case, Mr. 
Bevilacqua purchased a home at a foreclosure sale which had previously been owned by Mr. 
Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez was never located. Originally, Mr. Rodriguez had signed a deed of 
trust naming MERS as beneficiary. Through inadequately handled assignments, the property 
listed U.S. Bank as the assignee, and it instituted foreclosure proceedings. Mr. Bevilacqua sued 
to quiet title, and the Supreme Court ruled he lacked standing, since he possessed no title due to 
the improper foreclosure. The suit was dismissed without prejudice. Mr. Bevilacqua's position 
was heavily supported by Amicus briefs from the Attorney General of Massachusetts, Professors 
Adam Levitin (Georgetown), Christopher Petersen (University of Utah) and Katherine Porter 
(University of California). It should be clear that a ruling affirming the decision of the district 
court in this matter would leave thousands of Idaho property purchasers at risk of a similar fate 
should traditional concepts of property law be held to be meaningless. 
Assignment of Error # 4: Did the District Court err in accepting hearsay affidavits from counsel 
for Appellees? 
Over objection from Appellant's attorney, the District Court accepted affidavits from 
counsel for Appellees (Record at 143-144) (Transcript at 41-42). These affidavits and 
attachments are all hearsay, as there was no showing counsel had personal knowledge of the 
contents contained there. While he attested to the court that he was only saying the documents 
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were those in the public record (Transcript at 42), as noted above, the documents filed of record 
are most probably false, inaccurate or grossly negligent. There is no indication that counsel 
contacted the "assistant secretaries" who signed the purported assignments to ascertain if they 
were properly signed by proper officers. Rule 56 has long been construed to require more than 
hearsay in terms of the competence of the evidence submitted Sprinkler Irrigation Company, Inc. 
v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc. 85 P.3d 667, 139 Idaho 691 (Idaho, 2004); State v. 
Sharma Resources Limited Partnership 899 P.2d 977, 127 Idaho 267 (Idaho 1995). Indeed, 
Sharma accurately states the long standing rule that documents which would not be admissible at 
trial may not form the basis for proper evidence on a summary jUdgment. Id at 981. The 
affidavit submitted on behalf of Appellees, not only fails to show that counsel did not Imow the 
facts contained therein of his own personal knowledge, his testimony could never be admissible 
at trial for so long as he served as counsel of record. Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
3.7. Mr. Uhl's affidavit was not only self serving, but involved issues and facts which are being 
directly contested on this appeal, as they were below. As a consequence, Appellant submits that a 
remand for discovery is the only proper course of action in this matter. 
Assignment of Error #5: Is Appellant entitled to attorney fees and costs? 
Appellant hereby moves the Court for an award of attorney fees as provided by Idaho 
Appellate Rules 41 and will submit the appropriate memorandum of costs as provided by Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40 upon decision. While she is not currently represented by counsel, she hopes to 
have retained an attorney by the time of oral argrnnent, or earlier. Should she succeed, she 
wishes to preserve her claim for all appropriate fees and costs. Should she not succeed, she prays 
only for costs. 
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A prevailing party is entitled to costs, and need not specify them in the manner a request 
for attorney fees might require, LA.R. 40 and I.C. 12-107. 
Rule 41(a) also provides: 
(a) Application for Attorney Fees - Waiver. Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal 
must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief 
filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5); provided, however, 
the Supreme Court may permit a later claim for attorney fees under such conditions 
as it deems appropriate. 
Appellant is entitled to attorney fees (and/or paralegal expenses) if it is shown that the 
Court concludes Appellees resisted the appeal when the court finds that Appellee defended it 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. In Re Matter of Encroachments, 2010 Opinion 
15 (Idaho App. 3/4/2010) 2010, citing Rendon V Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 894 P.2d 775 (Ct. 
App.1995). 
Careful review of the record reveals this is the overwhelming conclusion. Appellees 
drafted all foreclosure documents in such a manner that I.e. 45-1502 et. seq appeared to be 
applicable, without regard to the necessary legal underpinnings needed to establish their proper 
status. Rather than produce the documents necessary to establish standing, none of the 
documents given to Appellant, or for that matter the court, established the assignment history of 
her note and deed of trust, whether the proper endorsements had been made prior to foreclosure, 
Appellees' standing as actual owners of the note and deed of trust, nor their entitlement by valid 
documents establishing a binding assignment were not a part of the record. 
One must wonder why these critical documents were not produced if Appellees actually 
had the proof necessary to satisfy the court of their standing? Instead, Appellees persistently hid 
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behind the smoke screen of supposed compliance with the superficial requirements by using 
labels which suggest propriety. It is difficult not to wonder why if competent evidence necessary 
to win a case exists, it would not be readily produced? 
Rather than establish their claim with competent evidence at the trial proceeding, 
Appellees prefer to continue to assert that their position is legally valid on the basis of labels 
alone. 
To defend this appeal absent the proper proof at the lower level conclusively shows their 
position is unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Appellant submits that in a case this complex, with so many facts hotly 
contested and affecting such substantial property rights, no grant of a motion for summary 
judgment could ever be proper. For whatever reason, the district court chose to prevent Appellant 
from full participation in the litigation process in a manner that resulted in substantial injustice. 
Appellees desire to prevent the true facts from coming to light through full blown discovery in 
which truly relevant documents establish that the proper parties were not the ones seeking 
foreclosure. Lflstead, Appellees hide behind labels that give the appearat"1ce of proper compliance, 
when if exposed to the light of full fledged litigation, would show that they fall far short of the 
requirements of Idaho law. Appellant asks this Court to follow the traditional concepts of Idaho 
property law and prevent her from being yet one more victim of a fraudulent foreclosure. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
1) Appellant prays the court overrule the District Court and grant her a declaratory judgment 
on the issue of lack of standing. 
2) In the alternative, Appellant prays that this court overrule the District Court's decision 
and remand with an order that the matter proceed to trial. 
3) Further in the alternative, Appellant prays this Court for an order remanding this case 
back to District Court with an order requiring Appellees comply with all present and 
future discovery requests so the case may move forward to trial and proper resolution. 
4) For all other general and equitable relief to which Appellant may be entitled. 
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Vs Case #11 CV 00504 ); 
U.S. Bank, NA 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Sometimes, only the courts of law stand to protect the taxpayer. 
Somewhere, someone has to stand up. Well, sometimes is now, and the 











The court finds the following to be the facts and law applicable to this 
motion: 
1. 
- Otis Phillips is behind on his house payments. and is in grave danger 
of foreclosure. 
-The United States Government paid taxpayer dollars to the largest of 
our financial institutions, and to the European Union Banks, in order to prop , 




















-Twenty Billion of those dollars were handed over to the defendant, 
U. S. Bank. 
-U. S. Bank agreed to participate in the U. S. Government's RAMP 
program to help struggling homeowners. 
-U. S. Bank signed a Service Participation Agreement (SPA), in 
which the bailed out bank agreed to comply with the RAMP Guidelines for 
loan modification. 
-The RAMP guidelines require D. S. Bank to perform modification 
services for all mortgage loans it services. 
-Otis Phillips applied to modifY his mortgage with U. S. Bank. 
-D. S. Bank denied the ~equest, without numbers, figures, or 
explanation, reasoning, comparison to the guidelines, or anything. U. S. 
Bank would not reveal to Mr. Phillips how his income, or his house, or his 
expenses would make him ineligible according to RAMP guidelines. 
(This court cannot imagine why U. S. Bank will not make 
known to Mr. Phillips, a taxpayer, how his numbers put him 
outside the federal guidelines to receive a loan modification. 
Taking $20 Billion of taxpayer money was no problem for U. S. 
Bank. A cynical judge might believe that this entire motion to 
dismiss is a desperate attempt to avoid the discovery period, 
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where U. S. Bank would have to tell Mr. Phillips how his 
financial situation did not qualify him for a modification. Or, 
perhaps he was qualified, yet didn't receive the modification, in 
violation ofU. S. Bank's Service Participation Agreement 
(SPA). A cynical judge might think that, if the guidelines 
clearly prevented Mr. Phillips from getting his modification, 
then U. S. Bank would have trotted out that fact in mathematic 
equations, pie charts, and bar graphs, all on 8 by 10 glossy 
photo paper, with circles and arrows and paragraphs on the 
back explaining each winning number.· U. S. Bank's silence 
on this issue might heighten the suspicions of such a cynical 
jurist. I, on the other hand, am sure that nothing of the sort 
could be true. Maybe U. S. Bank no longer has any of the $20 
billion dollars left, and so their lack of written explanation 
might be attributed to some kind of ink reduction program to 
save money. I'm sure there is a perfectly reasonable 
explanation for why the U. S. Bank will not print out the ONE 
page of figures that show Mr. Phillip's financials compared to 
the RAMP guidelines to clear all this up.) 
I Apologies to Arlo Guthrie, Alice's Restaurant 
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-Otis Phillips claims to have suffered as a result ofU. S. Bank's 
actions, and 
-Otis Phillips wishes to avoid foreclosure. 
2. 
Georgia law allows third party beneficiaries to sue on contracts that 
are clearly intended to benefit a third party. Multiple courts from a variety 
of jurisdictions have extended such standing to third parties harmed as a 
result ofHA1\1P violations. (HAMP is not old enough to have generated a 
huge volume of cases.) Clearly, U. S. Bankcannot take the money, contract 
with our government to provide a service to the taxpayer, violate that 
agreement, and then say no one on earth can sue them for it. That is not the 
law in Georgia. In fact, since no administrative review is provided within 
HAMP, the courts are the only recourse. The Bank claims that the intended 
beneficiaries of HAMP are the very people w}:1.o CAN'T sue. Such argument· 
is absurd. 
3. 
Georgia law allows a third party to sue for negligence. Negligently 
implementing HAMP could sustain a claim in Georgia. 
4. 
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Georgia law allows claims for breach of a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Here, there are two contracts, the SPA and the loan with Mr. 
Phillips. U. S. Bank, like all parties to any contract, has a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. While difficult to defme, jurors know good faith and fair 
dealing when they see it, and jurors can spot the absence of same. 
5. 
Georgia allows claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
by persons who are victim's of malicious, willful,or wanton conduct 
specifically directed at them, even if not a party to the contract whose breach 
causes such injury. This is a question for the jury. 
6. 
Georgia prohibits wrongful foreclosures. In fact, Federal law also 
prohibits wrongful foreclosures. Mr. Phillips claims that U. S. Bank is not 
the proper party to pursue such an action, and is merely the servicer of the 
loan, not the holder. Further, Mr. Phillips asserts that compliance with 
HAMP guidelines is a condition precedent to foreclosure. 
Conclusion 
There is no merit to Defendant's motion to dismiss, and same is 
hereby denied. 
Judge Dennis Blackmon 
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Met Ufe Home Loans, a division of Met ) 
Life Bank, NA, ) 
) 
._---- ) Defendants. --_ .. _-------
CASE NO. CV 2010-0200 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY.JUDGMENT 
In this matter both parties moved /01' partial summary judgment. The plaintiff 
moved for sllmmary judgment 011 the basis lhal defendant lacked statutory authority to 
maintain a non-judicial foreclosure. defendanl failed to comply with I.e. § 45-1505 prior 
Page 1 or II 
ORDER (HV\NTIN(; IN P/\RT AND lWNY1NCJ IN PART ivlOTIONS FOR 
SllMlvlAR Y JUDeiMENT 
, L 
to initiating the foreclosure and detendant is not the real parly in interest. The defendant 
moved for summary judgment on three issues: ddendanl properly proceeded with the 
Ibreclostlre, ddendant has complied with I-lAMP, and defendant is the proper purty in 
interest. 
MERS INTRODUCTION 
Transfers of real property have traditionally required a public proclamation of the 
transfer of ownership with a mcmorializatiol1 of the transfer. The historical and long 
obsolete method was by livery of seisin, where the parties to the transaction would enter 
the property and the transferor would physically hand over dirt to the transferee in the 
presence of witnesses. Recordation oftitIe in the legal system the United States inherited 
Ii'om English common Jaw dates to the Domesday Book, a project completed in 1087, 
although it did not include all counties in England. Historically, land transfers must 
involve the government in some way, Currently, land transfers are recorded pursuant to 
the laws of the State of Idaho, and the other United States, In an attempt to streamline 
mortgage transfers for investors and speculators, the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System (MERS) was created.i'viersorp. Inc. v. Romaine. 8 N.Y.3d 90, 861 N.E.2d 81 
(N.Y. 2006). MERS is a private corporation formed by members who trade titles within 
the system by various means. 
The creation ofMERS and the difficulties encountered during foreclosures in 
which MERS transfers are involved have created problems l~)r courts around the country. 
There is a split of authority on some of the issues presented by this case. After a careful 
examination of the documents reflecting the chain of title in this case, an analysis ofthe 
Idaho statute on trust deed foreclosures, and the persuasive authority found in case law 
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1"1'0111 other states or the federal courts, it appears [hal MetLife, the defendant in this 
action, does not have the ability to foreclose on the plaintiff's property at this time. 
MclUre docs not now hnve any recorded beneficial interest in the real property at issue, 
although it probably now has the bcnelkial interest of the trust deed at issue. For that 
reason partial summary judgment for the plaintiff is appropriate for the reasons set forth 
below. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October J, 2006 the plaintin: Virgil Ralph (Ralph), executed a note (Note) in 
the amount of $50,232.00 payable to First Horizon Home Loans, a division of First 
Tennessee Bank N.A. (First Horizon). The Note contains no reference to MERS. This 
note was secured with a Deed of Trust on the reaJ property located at 908 A Street, 
Rupert, Idaho 83350. The Deed of Trust identifies Ralph as the "borrower", First Horizon 
as the "Lender, Land Title and Escrow as the "Trustee", and MERS as the "beneficiary". 
The Deed of Trust furtheJ' states "The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is 
MERS (solely as the nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) and the 
successors and assigns of MERS." Further in the Deed of Trust it states "Borrower 
understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by 
Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law 01' custom, 
MERS (as nominee fol' Lender and Lender's successors and assigns) has the right: to 
exercise any 01' all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclosure 
and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited 
[0, releasing and cancelling this Security Instrumelll." 
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Ralph flliled to make the payments required under the Note beginning on 
November I. 2008. On February 23,2009 an assignment of the Deed of Trust was 
executed by MERS assistant secretary Michael Fisher ro MetLife. The language of the 
assignment states that "For value received, the undersigned corporation hereby grants, 
assigns, and transfers [0 MetLile Home Loans, a division of MelLire Bank, N.A. all 
beneficial interest under lhat certain Deed ofTrust ... together with the Promissory Note 
secured by said Deed of TrlIst and also all rights accrued or to accrue under said Deed of 
Trllst." This assignment was recorded in Minidoka County on March 4,2009. 
A Notice of Default was prepared by Lynn Darling of Transnation Title and 
Escrow on March 3, 2009 and recorded on March 4, 2009. A Notice of Trustee's Sale 
was also prepared by Lynn Darling of Transnation Title and Escrow on March 3,2009 
which set a foreclosure sale date of July 16,2009. On March 4,2009 an Appointment of 
Successor Trustee was recorded in Minidoka County in which Michael Fisher of MetLife 
appointed Transnation Title and Escrow as the successor trustee. 
The scheduled foreclosure date was postponed mUltiple times. At some point 
proceedings were begun on a HAMP loan modification. On March 26. 2010 a Verified 
Complaint was filed by Ralph. An Order Confirming Temporary Restraining Order was 
entered on April 20,2010 effectively staying the foreclosure sale. On June 3, 201 I, the 
defendant, MetLife, t-1led a Motion for Summary Judgment And For Release Of Order 
Continuing Temporary Restraining Ordcr. On June 6, 2011 the plaintiff, Ralph, filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This Order is in response to [hose motions. 
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ANALYSIS 
A. Summary .Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions) and admissions on 
me, together with the affiduvits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'1 
f.R.C.P. 56(c); Scona. Inc. v. Green Wil/o}1' Trust, 133 Idaho 283 (l999). The courlmust 
liberally construe all disputed facts in favor oflhe non-moving party, and draw all 
reasonable inJi~l'eI1ces and conclusions supported by tbe record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks. 119 Idaho 539, 541 (1999). If cont1icting 
inferences are possible, summary judgment should be denied. Only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact after the affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have been construed 
in the light most favorable to the non~moving party should summary judgment be 
awarded. Loomis v. CiLy ({f Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 (1991). 
B. Defendant Lacks Statutory Authority to Maintain a Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
Under I.e. 45-1505(1) the trustee may foreclose a trust deed if "The trust deed; any 
assignments of the trust deed by ... the beneficiary ... are recorded in mortgage records 
in counties in which the property described in the deed is situated". The only recorded 
assignment of the trust deed is by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
(MERS) to MelLife Bank, N.A. dated February 23, 2009. That document purports to 
transfer all beneficial interest MERS had to MetLile. 
In order to comply with I.e. 4S-IS0S( I) then, MERS must have been the 
beneficiary of the trust deed and mllst have had a beneficial interest to transfer. The 
definition of beneficiary under 1.e. 45-1502(1) is "the person named or otherwise 
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designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or hi::; 
stlcce::;sor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee". While Idaho's statute allows a 
designated benellciary, and MERS is given the title "beneticiary" under the deed of trust, 
in no way is it the party whose benefit the trust deed is given. This is because the lender 
is retaining all the hallmarks of the beneficiary and the language in the deed limits what 
MERS is. This interpretation of I.e. 45-1502(1) is similar to that of a federal district 
court's interpretation ofORS 86.705( I), an Oregon statute nearly identical to I.e. 45-
1502(1), when applying identical MERS language in a deed of trust. Hooker v. Northwest 
7)'uslee ,,)'ervices. Inc., 20 I I WL 2119103 (D.Or. May 25, 2011). In one case in an Idaho 
District bankruptcy court, counsel f01' MERS has conceded that it is not an "economic 
beneficiary" as it will receive no value from the foreclosed property or collect money 
under the note. In re Sheridan, No. 08-20381 ~TLM (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho March 12,2009). 
Under that concession, it is difficult to see any benefit that MERS receives from tbe deed 
of trust. Pursuant to I.e. 45-1502(1), the real beneficiary under this deed of trust is the 
lender, First Horizon Home Loans, a Division of First Tennessee Bank N.A. (First 
Horizon) and any of its assigns. 
The specific language of the deed of trust states that MERS holds only the legal 
title in the deed of trust, not the equitable tille. This language clearly states that MERS 
has no beneficial interest in the deed of trust. There is also nothing in the deed of trllst to 
suggest {hat MERS has authority to transfer the Note. fnl'e Wilhelm, 407 B,R. 392 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). As slIch, the only interest MERS was capable of assigning was 
its legal interest in the deed of trust. This is the only interest that MERS was capable of 
assigning when it recorded the February 23, 2009 Assignment of Deed of Trust. While 
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this may be sufficient to allow for non-judicial t()reclosure in some slates, under Idaho 
law the assignment of the beneficial interest, or equitable title, in the deed of trust must 
be recorded pl'iol' to initiating a non-judicial foreclosure. Once again this same conclusion 
was reached by a federal district court when applying ORS 86.735(1), an Oregon statute 
nearly identical to I.e. 45- 1505(1 ). Hooker, 20 II WL 2119103 at * 3. 
This inlel'pl'elalion of the statute is also in line with the longstanding rule that the 
security follows the note. Hooker, 2011 WL 2119103 at *4 citing: CaJ7Jenler v. Longan, 
83 U.S. 271,274 (1872). Transferring the security without the note is a legal nullit.y. lei. If 
the defendant's interpretation ofMERS's abilities was correct, MERS would be able to 
transfer the deed of trust to an infinite number of pal' ties without any public record. 
However, these transfers, absent a simultaneous transfer of the note, result in nothing 
more than an infinite number ofJegal nullities under federal and Idaho law. ld .. I.e. 45-
1505( 1). The language in the deed of trust regarding MERS does not expressly, or 
implicitly, grant MERS that authority to transfer any interest in the note. In re Wilhelm, 
407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). So even ifMERS was capable of transferring a 
beneficial interest in the deed of trust, a legalnuJIity would arise. It appears that MetLife 
is now the holder of the note. However, MetLife conceded it could not prove the date of 
the transfer. 
The defendant has cited case Jaw frol11 different j urisdictiol1s that have reached 
varying conclusions. In Gomes v. Countl)'wide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th I l49 
(CaJ .App, 2011), a court found that MERS had authority to foreclose on behalf of the 
note holder because of the authority granted to it under the Deed ofTl'tIst. While the 
language.in that Deed ofTrus{ is identical to the language found in the current Deed of 
Page 7 of 11 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Trust, the issues are very different. Rathel' the current issue is similar to that n)llnd in 
Dob/e. a CalHol'l1ia Bankruptcy case that distinguished Gomes. In re Doble, No. 10-
I I 296-MM 13 (Bkrley.S.D.Ca!. April 14, 20J J )1. fn Doble that court'fbund MERS had no 
statutory authority to ussign the beneficial interest of the deed of trust under identical 
deed of trust language. lei. 
This court is not deciding whether MERS does, or does not, have the authority to 
foreclose on behalf of the note holder. Rather this court must determine whether a 
beneficiary; as defined under Jdaho law, has the ability to foreclose prior to recording its 
beneficial interest in the property. Hypothetically, assuming ihis COUli was to adopt the 
Gomes interpretation ofMERS authority, MctUfe would have been able to foreclose on 
the propeliy on the behalf of First Horizon, as MERS was capable of assigning its 
nominee status to MelUfe. Yet under Idaho law, MctUfe would be unable to foreclose 
on its own behalf until its beneficial interest was recorded in Minidoka County. As this is 
not the present issue, Gomes is inapplicable in this situation. 
Another case cited by the defense is a federal district court decision applying Utah 
law, Fowler v. Recontrus( Company, NA., 2011 WL 839863 (D. Utah March 10, 20 II). 
In that decision, the court found that in applying Utah Jaw, identical Deed of Trust 
language made MERS the beneficiary, and as slIch, MERS was able to transfer that 
benefic·ial interest 10 another bank. ld. Fowler highlights the stl'Uggle of the courts over 
MERS. Utah courts looking at the same trust deed language have come to the opposite 
conclusion of this court and the cases cited in this order. This court finds the reasoning in 
Wilhelm, Hooker, Doble, and Sheridan more persuasive. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 
I .)'lujj'llf/1e Idaho Real Esrafe COlllmission!'. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630 (200 I) (considering unpublished 
opinions as an example, no! HS binding precedent, is appropriate). 
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(Bankr. D. Idaho 2(09); Hooker v. Northwest 7hlsfee Services. Inc. 1 2011 WL 2119103 
(D.Or. Muy 25, 20 I J); In re Doh/e. No. I 0-11296-MM 13 (Bkrtcy.S.D.CaJ. April 14, 
2011); /11 re Sheric/cJI1. No. 08-20381-TLM (Bkrtcy.D.ldaho Mat'ch 12,2009). An 
important reason is the cont1icting language in the deed of trust injecting MERS into the 
transaction. Essentially MERS wanls to limit its status 011 one hand but gain all the rights 
of a beneficiary or the lender if something goes wrong on the other. 'rhere is no good 
reason to allow MERS to detine itself in a contlicting manner to the detriment of the 
grantor of the deed of trust, or potentially to the lender, or in derogation of the Idaho 
statute. 
Additionally, neither party argued the Statute of Frauds. However. 10 be an agent 
for the purposes of a transfer of real property, the authority of the agent must be in 
writing. I.C. §9-505(4). The ambiguous language as to MERS in the deed oftl'Ust poses a 
problem on this issue. Nothing in the deed of trust suggests MERS itself has the authority 
to se[1 or assign the beneficial interest. Thus, it is not clear how MERS could purport to 
transfer First Horizon's beneficial interest in the deed of trust to MetLife. 
There is also nothing in the record showing how MERS's actions were necessary 
to comply with law or custom, as the language in the deed of trust describes. Commercial 
convenience does not equal necessity, and the raw in Idaho can be followed. In re 
Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 824 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011). A bit of work by First Horizon docs 
not make the transaction impossible. 
As there is no reco"ded assignment fl'Ol11 First 1--1orizon, the lender under (he deed 
of trust that holds the beneficial interest, to the defendant, Met Life Home Loans, a 
Page 9 of 1l 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENY1NG IN PART MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
division of Met liCe Bank, N.A. (Metl,ife), the defendunllacks starutory authority to 
proceed with a nOI1~judicial foreclosure at I'his lime. 
C. McfLife Not In Compliance I.C. 45~1505 
Since MelLire was incapable of initiating a non-judicial foreclosure, they are 
incapable of complying with I.e. 45-1505. 
n. Summary Judgment Denied llS to the HAM!> Issue 
There is no evidence in tbe record to determine at which time MetLife became the 
holder of the note, and thus the beneficiary of the deed of trust. As such, the cdurl is 
unable to determine at what point in time MetLife became capable of initiating I-lAMP 
proceedings with the plaintifI Summary judgment on the matter is thus inappropriate at 
this time. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is granted because of defendant's 
lack of statutory authority to foreclose. Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment 
is denied regarding statutory compliance and HAMP compliance. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: _ltf-.'--(O+-( t_{ ___ _ 
Signed: --Hl'¥J,I-''-PJ-l'+-''fl-''---f-b..-'\'r''--i----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Santos Garza, Deputy Clerk for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that 
on the __ LD-._ day of _~ ___ , 20) 1, I filed the original and caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document: ORDER 
GRANTING lN PART AND DENYING IN PART SUMMARY JUDGMENT to each of 
the persons as listed below: 
Laura E. Burri 
Ringer! Law Chartered 
455 S. Third Street, P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, ID 8370 I ~2773 
Michael F. McCarthy 
Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. 
475 Polk Street 
Twin Falls, ID 8330J 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ I-land Delivery 
_ .. _ Overnight Mai I 
Via Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ I-land Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Via Facsimile 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY, 1~~~ "-'-~ 
... Santos Garza 
Deputy Clerk 
Page 11 of I 1 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Dbt l' !2;21.dw 'j 1385. F~vUvN C!!!Epdvn f oLl2: !!!!Qrhe!1301: t22!!!Qbhf !2!pg41 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, NORTHWEST 
TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 1O-CV-274-EJL-Ltvffi 
REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
This case has been referred by presiding District Judge Edward J. Lodge to 
undersigned Magistrate Judge Larry M. Boyle for all pretrial matters. (Dkt. 18). 
Currently pending is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) made by 
Defendant Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. (NWTS) (Dkt. 5) and Motion for Entry of 
Final Default Judgment (Dkt.17) against the other Defendant, HSBC Bank USA, National 
Association. The Court has reviewed the motions, the parties' briefing and arguments, as 
well as all of the referenced documents, and finds that oral argument will not further aid 
the decisional process on this motions. The Court therefore enters the following Report 
and Recommendation that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in 
part, and Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment be denied. 
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BACKGROUND 
The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No.1) and attached 
exhibits, and documents of public record attached to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss of 
which the Court takes judicial notice. I 
In February 2007, David and Angela Carlyle executed a Deed of Trust on a 
residential property in McCall, Idaho (hereafter "the Property"), to secure a $1 million 
loan (the "Note") used to purchase the property. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association 
("Wells Fargo") was the lender and the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust. See Cmplt, ~~ 2, 
5, 6 & Ex. 1. The Property consists of two parcels - Parcell is located in Adams County 
and Parcel 2 is located in Valley County. The Deed of Trust was duly recorded in both 
counties on February 14,2007. See Cmplt, Exh. 1. 
1 A description of each of the documents attached to both Plaintiff's Complaint and 
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss are listed in chronological order in Attachment 1 to this 
Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the documents 
or that they were filed when and where they purport to have been. Plaintiff also 
specifically requests that the Court take judicial notice of the documents attached to 
Defendant's Motion that were not also attached to the Complaint. See Plaintiff's 
Objection to Defendant'S Motion to Dismiss [sic} Pursuant to FR.C.P. 12(b)(6), Dkt. 8, 
pp. 2 - 3. The Court will take judicial notice of the public record documents filed with the 
Valley and Adams County Recorders offices. See Lyon v. Gila River Indian Community, 
626 F.3d 1059, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Courts may take judicial notice of facts whose 
existence is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 
888-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public record); 
Branch v. Tunnell, 14 FJd 449,454 (9th Cir. 1994) (court may take judicial notice of 
documents central to allegations in complaint whose authenticity is not at issue); Fed. R. 
Evid. 201. See also Horne v. Potter, 329 Fed.Appx. 800,2010 WL 3245149, *2 (11 th Cir. 
2010) (affinning trial court taking judicial notice of public document on motion to 
dismiss). 
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The Carlyles defaulted on the Deed of Trust on or around April 2009. See Cmplt, 
~~ 2,3; Exh. 5. Wells Fargo then, on July 23, 2009, (1) appointed Defendant Northwest 
Trustee Services, Inc. (NWTS) as successor Trustee to Pioneer Title on the Deed of Trust 
and (2) assigned the Deed of Trust "[t]ogether with note or notes therein described or 
referred to, the money due and to become due thereon, with interest, and all rights 
accrued or to accrue under said Deed of Trust" to HSBC Bank USA, National 
Association "as Trustee for Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2007-4 ("Current Beneficiary")." Motion to Dismiss, Exhs. 
2,3. On that same date, NWTS, as successor Trustee, executed a Notice of Default 
stating that the Current Beneficiary declared the Deed of Trust in default and intends to 
sell the property to satisty the obligation. Cmplt., Exh. 5; Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 4. On 
October 9,2009, NWTS issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the Property which was to 
be held on February 8 and 9th in the respective counties. Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 5. 
Shortly thereafter, on or about October 23,2009, Plaintiff Bret Armacost 
purchased the Property from the Carlyles. Cmplt., Exh. 2 ("Purchase and Sale 
Agreement"). Plaintiff alleges that he entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
with the Carlyles in order "to provide asset protection pending discovery of the identity 
and location of the present creditor or Note Holder, or agent thereof, of the original Note 
and Deed of Trust" to attempt negotiations with the holder ofthe Note. Cmplt., ~ 3. The 
Cadyles actually transferred the Property by Warranty Deed, however, to a commercial 
entity, Second Ventures West, Inc. See Cmplt., Exh. 3. 
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UDt 1 !L;Ll.dW 11 :.)(50. t- KM. rvN C!!!Epdvn f oLl2: !!!!Qme!1301: ~2ll!Qbhf l5lpg41 
The Trustee's sale apparently did not go forward in February 2010, and NWTS 
issued a second Notice of Trustee's sale dated February 1,2010, for the sale to be held on 
June 3 and 4,2010. Cmplt., Exh. 6. On June 1,2010, Second Ventures, Inc. transferred 
its interest in the Property by Warranty Deed into Plaintiffs name, so that he could 
"represent himself in the preservation of his interest." Id., ,4 & Exh. 4. Plaintiff filed this 
action pro se against Defendants on the same date. Cmplt., (Dkt. 1). 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 1962 et seq., by foreclosing on the Property through the trustee 
sale, and/or making false representations in connection with their foreclosure efforts, 
without "standing" or authority to do so. Plaintiff also seeks a Declaratory Judgment that 
Defendants have no legal or equitable rights in the Note or mortgage for purposes of the 
foreclosure and no standing to execute the foreclosure. Defendant NWTS now moves to 
dismiss this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) arguing that Plaintiffhas failed to 
state a claim against it under the FDCP A. (Dkt. 5). 
Defendant HSBC Bank failed to appear. The Clerk entered Default against this 
Defendant on September 7,2009. (Dkt. 16). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Default 
Final Judgment against HSBC Bank on November 19,2010. (Dkt. 17). 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Standard of Law 
A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a party's claim for relief. 
When considering such a motion, the Court's inquiry is whether the allegations in a 
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pleading are sufficient under applicable pleading standards. Rule 8(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the minimum pleading requirement, which is that the 
plaintiff provide only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief," and "giv[ing] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 
S.Ct. 1955(2007). 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all 
non-conclusory, factual (not legal) allegations made in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). Based upon these 
allegations, the court examining a complaint for sufficiency of information must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 
579 F .3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 
S.Ct. at 1949. 
After any conclusory statements have been removed, the court must then analyze 
the remaining factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest 
an entitlement to relief" Delta Mech., Inc., 345 Fed. Appx. at 234. "While a complaint 
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than 
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 
not do." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, 
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"[fJactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, 
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 
fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In sum, a party must allege "enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
In discussing this standard, a recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion stated 
that "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts 
in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason 
to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for 
these claims." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (lOth Cir. 2008). In this way, 
while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary," a plaintiffmust allege enough facts to "give the 
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). 
Generally, with respect to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the Court may not consider any 
evidence contained outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for 
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and allowing the non-moving party an 
opportunity to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 
907-908 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials- documents 
attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 
matters of judicial notice- without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment." Id. at 908 (citing Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977,980 (9th Cir. 
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2002); Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.1994); 2 James Wm. Moore et aI., 
Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed.1999)). 
B. Discussion 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant NWTS violated two provisions of the FDCP A. 
First, Plaintiff alleges Defendant wrongfully facilitated an "eminent" foreclosure sale of 
Plaintiff s property "by filing and causing to be filed foreclosure documents into the 
public record without standing to do so in direct violation of the Note, Deed of Trust" and 
15 U.S.C. § 1692f. This section of the FDCPA proscribes generally unfair or 
unconscionable means of collecting or attempting to collect any debt.ld. 
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant NWTS, "in the capacity of a third party debt 
collector executed a power of sale foreclosure without standing under the terms of the 
Note and Deed of Trust" in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1O). This provision 
specifically prohibits "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect 
or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer." 
Defendant NWTS argues that Plaintiff s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief 
as a matter of law under the FDCP A primarily because Defendants had the right to 
execute a non-judicial foreclosure on the Property under both the Deed of Trust and the 
Idaho non-judicial foreclosure statutes, I.C. § 45-1502 et seq. Defendant further argues 
that "most federal courts" have held that the FDCP A does not apply to enforcement of 
security interests, such as in the context of a non-judicial foreclosure. See Motion to 
Dismiss, (Dkt. 5), p. 11 (citing Hulse v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 195 F. Supp.2d 1188 
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(D. Or. 2002); Jordan v. Kent Recovery Services, 731 F. Supp. 652, 657-58 (D. Del. 
1990)). Regardless, Defendant argues further, that because it complied with the Idaho 
non-judicial foreclosure statute, it was well within its legal rights to foreclose on the 
Property, and Plaintiff has failed to state any fact of a false or misleading practice, or 
unconscionable means of collecting a debt, that would be actionable under the FDCP A. 
Id. 
As discussed fully below, this Court agrees that the FDCP A generally does not 
apply to non-judicial foreclosure actions. However, there is an exception in the context of 
enforcing a security interest, which would include a non-judicial foreclosure action, a 
claim for which Plaintiff s Complaint adequately pleads and Defendant's motion to 
dismiss failed to address. For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended here that the 
Court grant Defendant's motion in part and deny the motion in part at this time consistent 
with the following Report and Recommendation. 
1. Non-judicial foreclosure proceedings are not "debt collection" 
generally under the FDCP A. 
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) ''to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors 
who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt 
collection abuses." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692. In furtherance of this goal, the FDCPA requires 
and prohibits certain activities by "debt collectors" that are done"in connection with the 
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collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § § 1692c (prohibits certain communications), 1692d 
(prohibits harassment or abuse), 1692e (prohibits false or misleading representations), 
1692f (prohibits unfair practices) & 1692g (requiring validation of debts). 
A central issue in this case is whether or not Defendant's complained of actions -
which all relate to instituting non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the Property -
constitute "debt collection" activities under the FDCP A. 2 Courts conflict on this issue in 
general. Cf Brown v. Morris, 243 Fed. Appx. 31,35-36 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
foreclosure action is not per se debt collection under the FDCP A and no error in jury 
instruction that "[o]rdinarily, the mere activity of foreclosing ... under a deed of trust is 
not the collection of a debt within the meaning of the [FDCP A] unless other actions are 
taken beyond those necessary to foreclose under the deed of trust, and were taken in an 
effort to collect a debt" (brackets in appellate order)) and Heinemann v. Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc., 47 F.Supp.2d 716, 722 (D. W.Va. 1998) (same), affd, 173 F.3d 850 (4th 
Cir.1999), with Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006)(concluding 
2 Courts deciding this issue have also looked to the definition of a "debt collector," 
versus "debt collection" activity. Numerous district courts in this Circuit have held that 
"the FDCP A does not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings since a debt collector 
for the purposes of the Act does not include the consumer's creditors, a mortgage 
servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the 
time it was assigned." Allen v. United Financial Mortgage Corp, 2010 WL 1135787, *6 
n. 7 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Suetos v. Banko! Am. Nat 'I Ass'n, No. 09-727,2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20538, *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8,2010) (internal quotations omitted)). These 
cases relying on the definition of "debt collector" do not apply in this case because the 
allegations of the Complaint and the documents filed with Defendant's Motion establish 
that Defendants' interests in the Deed of Trust clearly arose after the debt was in default 
and presumably for the purpose of instituting foreclosure actions. 
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[A ]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails 
in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, 
or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts 
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.. .. For purposes of section 
1692f(6) of this title,[5] such term also includes any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the 
principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. 
Id. § 1692a(6). And so the argument goes, if "debt collection" generally included the 
enforcement of a security interest, the language specifYing so for the purposes of 
§ 1692f(6) would be surplusage, and such a construction would violate a "long standing 
canon of statutory construction that terms in a statute should not be construed so as to 
render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous." Beck v. Prupis, 529 
U.S. 494, 506, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 1617 (2000).6 
This Court is persuaded by the reasoning and agrees with the its sister district 
courts that a non-judicial foreclosure action generally does not constitute a "debt 
collection activity" under the FDCP A. This Court disagrees, however, that actions to 
enforce a security action-including a non-judicial foreclosure-can never be actionable 
5 Section 1692f(6) specifies that "taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial 
action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if (A) there is no present right to 
possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest; 
(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or (C) the property is 
exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement" constitute unfair practices under 
this section of the FDCP A. 
6The Idaho statute governing mortgage foreclosures "and other liens" draws a 
similar distinction between debt recovery and enforcement of a security interest. See I.C. 
§ 6-101 ("There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of 
any right secured by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter.") 
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under the FDCP A. This Court fmds an exception to this general rule stated in § 1692f( 6) 
of the Act, as discussed below. See also Montegomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 
700-01 (6 th Cir. 2003) (noting exception for a security enforcer under § 1692f(6)); 15 
U.S.C. § I 692i(a)(1)(venue provision applicable in case of an action to enforce a security 
provision). 
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs Complaint attempts to make a claim under 
the FDCP A other than under § 1692f( 6), Defendant's motion to dismiss should be 
granted. See Hulse, 195 F.Supp.2d at 1204 (finding that allegations of wrongful 
foreclosure activity including filing notice of sale without beneficial interest in deed of 
trust, falsely stating appointment as trustee and that plaintiff failed to make payments, fail 
to state a claim under § 1692f(1)); Gwin, 2010 WL 1691567, *6 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (filing 
notices of default and of trustee's sale not "debt collection" activities within the scope of 
§ 1692e).7 
2. Section 1692f(6) applies to the enforcement of a security instrument, 
including nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, and the record is 
insufficient to establish that Defendant had the right to institute the 
foreclosure proceedings on the Property as a matter of law. 
Several courts recognize that § 1962f( 6) is one provision in the FDCP A that does 
7 The Court notes, that in this case, the Notices of Trustee's Sale bore obvious 
disclaimers identifYLl1g the sales as "AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT." See 
Cmplt., Exh. 6, Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 5. However, the statement "does not 
automatically trigger the protections FCDPA, just as the absence of such language does 
not have dispositive significance." Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 614 F.3d 380, 
386 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 
1998)). 
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apply to the enforcement of a security interest. See, e.g., Chomilo v. Shapiro, 
Nordmeryer & Zielke, LLP, 2007 WL 2695795, *3 (D. Minn. 2007); Jordan v. Kent 
Recovery Services, Inc., 731 F.Supp. 652, 657 (D. Del. 1990); James v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 47 FJd 961, 962 (8th Cir.l995) (citing to Jordan and finding that 
repossession companies are generally not subject to the FDCP A except for section 
1692f(6)). See also Statements o/General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed.Reg. 50097 (1988) (December 13, 1988) 
("If a party falls only within the security interest provisions of the definition, then they 
"are subject only to this provision [§ 1692f(6)] and not the rest of the FDCPA.,,)8 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits a "debt collector" from using any 
"unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1692f. Among other conduct, this section specifically prohibits a debt collector from 
"[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or 
disablement of property if ... there is no present right to possession of the property 
claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest ... " 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1692f(6)(a). 
8Courts also disagree on limiting the applicability of the FDCP A in the context of a 
debt collector enforcing a security interest to only § 1692f(6) claims. See, e.g., 
Katlenback v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006)(holding that a party who satisfies 
section 1692a(6)'s general definition of "debt collector" is a debt collector for the entire 
FDCPA even if only enforcing a security interest). This issue is not presented in this case 
because there are no facts alleged suggesting that Defendant(s) meet the general 
defmition of "debt collector." 
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Plaintiff does not specifY which section of § 1692fhe claims Defendant violated. 
He lists § 1692f generally. Broadly construing both the allegations of his Complaint, and 
the Act, the Court is of the view that Plaintiff s allegations that Defendant "lacks 
standing" to institute the foreclosure actions could equate to a claim that Defendant took 
nonjudicial action to effect dispossession. .. of property ... [with] no present right to 
possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest. . 
. . . " Accord Riordan v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.c., 2010 WL 3023292, *4 (D. Ariz. 2010) 
(citing McMillan v. Collection Professionals Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2006); 
see also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F .3d 1162, 1176 (9th 
Cir. 2006)(Remedial nature ofFDCPA requires liberal construction by the courts.) 
Accordingly, the Court reviews the sufficiency of the Complaint under 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1692f(6). 
Plaintiff makes two claims as to how Defendant( s) "lack standing" to foreclose on 
the Property. First, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants violated the FDCPA because 
Wells Fargo "transferred" its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust before it appointed 
NWTS as the successor trustee and before assigning the Deed of Trust to Defendant 
HSBC Bank, see Cmplt., ~ 9, and thus, neither Defendant received its interest 
(assignment/appointment) by a party authorized to transfer it under the Deed of Trust, see 
Cmpit., ~ ~ 9, 13, 14. Plaintiffs second basis for the claim is that neither Defendant is "in 
possession of the required instruments Note and Deed of Trust, the instruments of 
evidence of an obligation and authority to enforce that obligation." Cmpit., ~ 14(c) & (d). 
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As such, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants had no legal right or "standing" to foreclose on 
the property. Id. 
a. Plaintiff's allegations that Wells Fargo lost authority to transfer 
its interest in the Deed of Trust are insufficient as a matter of 
law. 
Wells Fargo, as the original lender and beneficiary to the Deed of Trust, was 
clearly vested under the Deed of Trust with the authority to remove the Trustee, appoint a 
successor trustee and assign the Deed of Trust. The question presented, however, is 
whether Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth sufficient allegations to challenge Wells Fargo's 
ongoing authority, or to establish, for the purposes of this motion, that Wells Fargo 
somehow lost its authority prior to making the assignment or appointment. The Court is 
of the opinion that it is not. 
Id. 
Plaintiff s specific allegation is that: 
Wells Fargo, N.A., not a party to this action, lost all authority, right of 
enforcement and beneficial interest rights when the Note and Deed of Trust 
were released for processing under the standard banking procedures for 
negotiable instruments pursuantto UCC 3-203 Transfer ofInstruments; Rights 
Acquired by Transfer .... 
Defendant's motion to dismiss does not address Plaintiff s apparent allegation that 
Wells Fargo lost its rights to transfer under the Deed of Trust. However, the Court fmds 
that Plaintiff s allegations are too vague to meet the minimal pleading requirements of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(3), and do not give Defendant notice of the basis for the claim alleged. 
Plaintiff alleges that the documents were "released for processing" but cites a Uniform 
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Commercial Code provision, adopted by Idaho as I.C. § 28-3-203, which discusses the 
transfer of a negotiable instrument "for the purpose of giving to the person receiving 
delivery the right to enforce the instrument." I.C. § 28-3-203(1). Plaintiff's Complaint 
provides no clear factual statement as to how Wells Fargo's processing of documentation 
amounted to an intentional transfer of its interest, or otherwise may have resulted in Wells 
Fargo's loss ofits interest in the Note or Deed of Trust. 
Without sufficient allegations to the contrary, the record is clear that Wells Fargo, 
as the original beneficiary to the Note and the Deed of Trust, had the right under the Deed 
of Trust to assign its interest in the Deed of Trust, remove the Trustee and appoint a 
successor trustee. Any claim to the contrary is not sufficiently plead in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 9 
Without setting forth any factual basis or belief supporting his theory that the 
original beneficiary lost the authority clearly delegated by the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff 
cannot maintain his claim under the FDCP A on this basis. 
9Plaintiff argues in response to the Motion to Dismiss that this fact is in doubt 
because Defendant did not file some document proving the authority of the individual's 
signature on behalf of Wells Fargo in the Assignment of the Deed of Trust or the 
Appointment of Successor Trustee. See Objection to Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 8), pp. 3 -
4. Plaintiff's Complaint does not contain these allegations, nor would they state an 
independent claim. Plaintiff makes no affirmative allegation and appears to contend that 
he is entitled to pursue a claim to discover whether or not the person signing the 
document had the authority to act for Wells Fargo. The pleading standard is not an 
onerous one, but it does require more than a mere speculative suggestion that a fraudulent 
act may have been committed. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
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b. The record is insufficient at this time to determine as a matter of 
law that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for relief 
based on Defendant's lack of possession of the Note. 
In his Complaint, Plaintiff also claims that because "HSBC did not have actual 
possession ofthe Note signed by the Carlyles, it did not have standing to foreclose and 
the foreclosure is void as a matter oflaw." Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Dismiss, at 
p.4. 
Plaintiffs claims are similar to the "show me the Note" defense to foreclosure that 
is the subject of many judicial decisions in both federal and state courts nationwide. 1o 
By way of background: 
Generally, a mortgage loan consists of a promissory note and security 
instrument, usually a mortgage or a deed of trust, which secures payment on 
the note by giving the lender the ability to foreclose on the property. Typically, 
the same person holds both the note and deed of trust. In the event that the note 
and the deed of trust are split, the note, as a practical matter becomes 
unsecured. The practical effect of splitting the deed of trust from the 
promissory note is to make it impossible for the holder of the note to foreclose, 
unless the holder of the deed of trust is the agent of the holder of the note. 
Without the agency relationship, the person holding only the note lacks the 
power to foreclose in the event of default. The person holding only the deed 
of trust will never experience default because only the holder of the note is 
entitled to payment of the underlying obligation. The mortgage loan [becomes] 
ineffectual when the note holder [does] not also hold the deed of trust. 
IOplaintiffs allegations that Defendants "lack standing" refers to the claims made 
in the bankruptcy context. Specifically, foreclosing entities file a motion for relief from 
the automatic bankruptcy stay in order to foreclose on the debtor's property. In those 
cases, the bankruptcy generally courts have required to the foreclosing entity to produce 
the original Note to prove sufficient interest in the debtor's estate to have standing to seek 
the relief from the stay. See, e.g., In re Wilheim, 407 B.R. 392 (Bkrptcy. D. Idaho 2009); 
In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 354 
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Box, 2010 WL 2228289, *5 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 2010). 
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Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
Debtors, or their representatives, across the country are defending residential 
foreclosures, with a great degree of success particularly in the bankruptcy context, with 
the argument that the foreclosing entity must have possession of both the note and the 
deed of trust to have the authority to foreclose on the Property. 
The issue is one of state law. Plaintiff's claim is based on the Uniform 
Commercial Code provision which specifies persons entitled to enforce a negotiable 
instrument, adopted by Idaho as I.C. § 28-3-30. Such persons include: 
(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession ofthe instrument 
who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the 
instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section 
28-3-309 or 28-3-418(4}. A person may be a person entitled to enforce the 
instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in 
wrongful possession of the instrument. 
Id. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, one becomes a "holder" of a negotiable 
instrument either by "transfer" or "negotiation," but both require obtaining possession of 
the instrument. See BankofNYv. Rajtogianis, 10 A.3d236, 2010 WL 5087866, *3 (N.J. 
Super Ch. 2010). A person not in possession of the hllstrument, therefore, must fall under 
one of the exceptions referenced in I.C. § 28-3-301(iii) to be entitled to enforce the 
instrument. 11 
11 Section 28-3-309 appears to be misnumbered or an outdated reference, and was 
intended to be § 28-3-308 addressing the circumstances under which a person not in 
possession of an instrument may enforce an instrument that has been lost, destroyed or 
stolen persons not in possession of a lost or stolen instrument. See I.C. § 28-3-301, 
Uniform Commercial Code Comment. 
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Defendant suggests that it qualifies as a person not in possession of a negotiable 
instrument but otherwise entitled to enforce it under I.C. § 28-3-301(iii). Defendant sets 
forth no explanation or argument establishing this fact as a matter oflaw. Rather, 
Defendant argues further that there is no requirement under Idaho law that it produce the 
Note, or to do anything else beyond that which is specifically articulated in the Idaho 
Trust Deed Act, I.C. §§ 45-1502 et seq., in order to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure. 
The Court agrees that the procedural requirements Defendant must meet to 
foreclose on the Property are those set forth in Idaho Trust Deed Act, id. See Roos v. 
Belcher, 79 Idaho 473,321 Pold 210 (1958). Moreover, there is no separate requirement 
under Idaho law that Defendant produce the original Note and Deed of Trust in order to 
do so. As Defendant points out, several courts in other jurisdictions have dismissed a 
similar claim on this basis. See Chilton v. Fed. Mortg. Ass 'n, 2009 WL 5197869 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009); Ernestberg v. Mortgage Investors Group, 2009 WL 160241 (D. Nev. 
2009)(Finding allegations that defendant's failure to produce note insufficient to 
invalidate foreclosure.); Putkkuri v. Recontrust Co., 2009 WL 32567 (S. D. Cal. 2009) 
(same); Wayne v. HomEq Servicing, Inc., 2008 WL 4642595 (D. Nev. 2008)(Defendant 
loan servicer not required to produce original of note; copies of note and deed of trust 
were sufficient to establish its interest.) 
This Court does not believe, however, that the inquiry ends with Defendant's 
compliance with the Idaho non-judicial foreclosure statute. Liberally construing 
Plaintiff's complaint, as this Court must, Plaintiff is not challenging Defendant's 
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procedure - he is challenging Defendant's right to initiate the procedure. One could not 
reasonably contend that compliance with a procedure gives substantive rights not 
otherwise possessed. The question remains whether Defendant's right or authority to 
foreclose on the Property remains. 
There appear to be two sub-issues that may be dispositive on this point. The fIrst 
issue regards whether or not Idaho requires that a foreclosing entity be in possession of 
the Note in order to have the right to enforce the Deed of Trust. Volumes, including two 
bankruptcy decisions from this district, have been written on this topic espousing a view 
consistent with Plaintiff's position that possession of the Note is a requirement to its 
enforcement. See In re Wilheim, 407 B.R. 392 (Bkrptcy. D. Idaho 2009) (Denying 
motion for relief from stay to institute foreclosure on basis that movant who could not 
prove status as holder of Note and Deed of Trust lacked authority to foreclose necessary 
to establish standing.); In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2009)(Holding 
movant lacked sufficient fmancial interest to seek a stay to foreclose on property where 
movant could not show it had possession of the Note.); see also Laboissiere v. GMAC 
Mortgage, 2010 WL 2836107, *2 (Noting that I.e. § 45-911 is in accord with In re 
Jacobson, 402 B.R. 354 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Wash. 2009), which held that assignment of a 
deed of trust was insuffIcient to confer standing "because security follows the obligation 
secured, rather than the other way around."); In re Box, 2010 WL 2228289, *5 (Bkrtcy. 
W.D. Mo. 2010) ("Possession of the note insures that this creditor, and not an unknown 
one, is the one entitled to exercise rights under the deed fo trust, and that the debtor will 
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not be obligated to pay twice."); US.Bank National Association v.Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 
_N.E.2d_(Mass. 2011) (decided on state law grounds). Some authority exists also 
rejecting the position, but as discussed above, these decisions tend not to analyze whether 
or not the foreclosing entity must hold the note, only whether or not the note must be 
produced prior to conducting a non-judicial foreclosure. See, e.g., Mansour v. Cal-
Western Reconveyance Corp, 618 F .Supp.2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009). Again, the 
Court is not able to conclude that Plaintiff's complaint is limited to this procedural claim. 
The second issue relevant here concerns Defendant's contention that it obtained 
the authority to foreclose on the Property based on the recorded Assignment of Deed of 
Trust from Wells Fargo to HSBC Bank. Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 3. There are two views 
on the consequence of the assignment of the Deed of Trust. 
Regarding assignments, the fIrst view is that without the assignment of the debt, 
the assignment of the security is a nullity. See Laboissiere v. GMAC Mortgage, 2010 WL 
2836107 (D. Idaho) (quoting In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bkrtcy. W. D. Wash. 
2009) ("[H]aving an assignment of the deed is not suffIcient, because the security follows 
the obligation secured, rather than the other way around.'). See also Restatement (Third) 
Property, § 5.4, Reporters' Note, Transfer of the mortgage also transfers the obligation, 
Comment c (citing In re Hurricane Resort Co., 30 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy. D. Fla.1983); Hill v. 
Favour, 84 P.2d 575 (Ariz. 1938); Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal.Rptr. 529 
(Cal. Ct. App.1969) (dictum); Hamilton v. Browning, 94 Ind. 242 (1883); Pope & Slocum 
v. Jacobus, 10 Iowa 262 (1859); Van Diest Supply Co. v. Adrian State Bank, 305 N.W.2d 
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342 (Minn. 1981); Kluge v. Fugazy, 536 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div.1988); Miller v. 
Berry, 104 N.W. 311 (S.D.1905)).12 
The second view is that the assignment of the security also assigns the debt unless 
there is an indication of the parties' intent not to assign the debt. See Restatement (Third) 
Property, Mortgages § 504(b) (1997). This approach is adopted by the Restatement 
(Third) Property, Mortgages § 504(b) (1997). The Restatement section in its entirety 
states: 
(a) A transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage also transfers the 
mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree otherwise. 
(b) Except as otherwise required by the Uniform Commercial Code, a transfer 
of a mortgage also transfers the obligation the mortgage secures unless the 
parties to the transfer agree otherwise. 
( c ) A mortgage may be enforced only by, or on behalf of, a person who is 
entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures. 
Restatement (Third) Property, Mortgages § 5 o4(b) (1997).13 
12 Among the "gems" and "free offerings" of the late Professor Chester Smith 
of the University of Arizona College of Law was the following analogy. 
The note is the cow and the mortgage the tail. The cow can survive without 
a tail, but the tail cannot survive without the cow. 
Best Fertilizers of Arizona, Inc. v. Burns, 571 P.2d 675,676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), 
reversed on other grounds, 570 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1977); see also Carpenter v. Longan, 83 
U.S. 271, 21 L.Ed. 313 (1872)). 
13But even under the well established principal that the assignment of the security 
without the debt renders such assignment a nullity, common law recognizes the parties' 
intent otherwise controls. See Merritt v. Bartholich, 26 N.Y. 44, 45 (N.Y. 1867) (Noting 
that "the incident shall pass by the grant of the principal, but not he principal by the grant 
of the incident" unless "such was the intent of the parties.") The Reporters' Note to the 
Restatement commentary nonetheless recognizes substantial authority to the contrary, 
holding that an assignment of the mortgage (security) without the obligation is a nullity, 
and distinguishes the Restatement approach. See Restatement (Third) Property, § 5 A, 
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Idaho Code § 45-911 states that "[t]he assignment of a debt secured by mortgage 
carries with it the security." This provision appears to codifY the common law rule 
regarding the result to the security of an assignment of the debt, but does not address the 
reverse. There does not appear to be any Idaho state court case law on this point of 
assignment. 
In this case, the only reference to Defendants' interest in the Note itself is a generic 
statement that the Assignment of Deed of Trust also included the "note or note(s)" 
referenced in the Deed of Trust. Under the common law and the Restatement (Third) 
Property, § 5.4 approach, such an evidence of intent to assign the note might be sufficient 
to conclude that a valid assignment occurred as between Wells Fargo and HSBC Bank, 
the assignor and assignee. See United Home Loans, Inc. v. McGinnis, 71 B.R. 885, 889 & 
n. 1 (W.D. Wash. 1987)(citing Geffen v. Paletz, 312 Mass. 43, 48 (N.E.2d 133 (1942); 59 
C.J.S. Mortgages § 359 (1949)("where there is something to indicate that such was the 
intention of the parties, an assignment of a mortgage will carry the debt with it, as where 
the assignment purports to assign the mortgage note"); G.S. Nelson & D.A. Whitman, 
Real Estate Finance Law, at 366 (2d ed. 1985) ("[i]fthe 'assignment' also mentions that 
the debt is being transferred ... the transfer is unquestionably complete.")). 
Whether the Assignment of Deed of Trust in this case is sufficient to allow 
enforcement of the Note against the debtor in view ofthe Uniform Commercial Code 
requirements for negotiable instruments, however, is yet another question. 
Reporters' Note, Transfer of the mortgage also transfers the obligation, Comment c 
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Because Defendant's arguments on Motion to Dismiss focused on (1) denying the 
application of the FDCPA to its actions en totale, or alternatively, (2) asserting its 
compliance with the Idaho non-judicial foreclosure statutes, Defendant did not address in 
its Motion to Dismiss the countervailing case law on the requirement that it be a holder of 
the Note, or the issue of the validity of the assignment as a matter of law, or attempt to 
reconcile what appears to be two competing and conflicting bodies of law - important 
issues of Idaho law impacting residential home foreclosures. 
Based on the record before the Court, it may well be that the Assignment of the 
Deed of Trust indicates sufficient intent on the part of Wells Fargo to also assign the Note 
and to otherwise establish Defendant's authority to foreclose on the Property under Idaho 
law. However, the Court is reluctant to recommend this finding on the record on a 
motion to dismiss without any statement of such from the Defendant, briefing on the issue 
as to the adequacy of the assignment under Idaho law, or without having been provided a 
copy of the Note which the Court would be required to construe, in part, in determining a 
valid assignment thereof. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. Casarano, 2010 WL 
3605427, *5 (Mass. Land Ct. 2010) (finding lost promissory note not negotiable 
instrument and reviewing assignment under general contract terms). 
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied in 
part with respect to the claim brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). 
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lVIOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Also pending is Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment (Dkt. 17) 
against non-appearing Defendant HSBC Bank USA, National Association under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b )(2). Under this Rule, a court may enter a default judgment 
against a party who is not a minor, incompetent, or in military service where the clerk, 
under Rule 55(a), has already entered the party's default based upon failure to plead or 
otherwise defend the action. A plaintiff is not entitled to entry of default as a matter of 
right; a court has discretion whether or not to enter a default judgment. Lau Ah Yew v. 
Dulles, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.l956). A district court may consider the following factors 
in exercising its discretion to enter a default judgment, including: "( 1) the possibility of 
prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiffs substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency 
of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 
dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, 
and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 
decisions on the merits." Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir.1986). 
In considering the sufficiency of the complaint and the merits of the plaintiffs 
substantive claim, facts not relating to damages alleged in the complaint generally are 
deemed to be true by virtue of the defendant's default. Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 
F.2d 557,560 (9th Cir.1977). A defendant is not held to admit facts that are not 
well-pleaded or to admit conclusions oflaw. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., LTD. v. Houston 
Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975) (holding that allegations concerning 
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existence and tenns of a contract did not support liability where allegations were 
contradicted by actual contract). As a result, where the allegations in a complaint are not 
"well-pleaded," liability is not established by virtue of the defendant's default. Id. 
In light of the foregoing and considering the factors above in view of the Court's 
recommendation regarding the appearing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court is of 
the view that default judgment should not be entered against HSBC Bank at this time. 
Several claims and allegations in the Complaint are not well plead. The one surviving 
claim does so in part due to the Court's obligation to construe a pro se complaint 
liberally. As such, HSBC Bank's liability may not be established by default. See id. 
Similarly, the claims and arguments against both Defendants are the same, and the 
Court's conclusion that Plaintiff s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, in part, 
applies equally as against both named Defendants. 
Further, considering another important factor, Plaintiff will not likely suffer 
prejudice at this time because the appearing Defendant's authority to foreclose on the 
Property is predicated upon the non-appearing Defendant's authority - and both issues 
must be fully litigated and resolved with or without the appearance ofHSBC Bank. This 
fact further supports the Court's decision not to enter default judgment at this time as it is 
likely that the results against each defendant may be inconsistent and lead to further 
litigation, which will be inefficient given the narrow issues presented in this case. 
Finally, the strong policy in favor of favoring decisions on the merits point toward 
the Court declining to enter default judgment against a non-appearing defendant in this 
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case. For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff s Motion for Entry of 
Final Default Judgment against HSBC Bank be denied. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Consistent with the foregoing REPORT, 
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (DIct. 5) be GRANTED IN PART AND 
DENIED IN PART; 
2. Plaintiffs Complaint alleging any claim for relief under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act other than for an unfair or unconscionable practice 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) based on the Defendants' authority to enforce 
the Note; 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment (Dkt. 17) be 
DENIED; 
4. Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint setting forth any 
additional facts which would support his claims for relief against 
Defendants under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692f(6) within 30 days of the date of any 
order adopting this Report and Recommendation. 
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DATED: February 9, 2011. 
o 
.7 
'Hohora Ie Larry M. Boyle 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
I Exh. Description/parties Recorded date Recorded date 
Valley County Adams County 
Cmplt. 1 Original Deed of Trust, 2114/2007 2114/2007 
MtD 1 2/14/2010 
Beneficiary: Wells Fargo NA 
Trustee: Pioneer Title 
:Mtd2 Appointment of Successor 7/3012009 11712010 
Trustee - Northwest Trustee 
Services, Inc. 
Executed by Beneficiary Wells 
Fargo NA on 
Mtd3 Assignment of Deed of Trust 7/3012009 117/2010 
to HSBCExecuted by 
Beneficiary Wells Fargo NA 
on 
Cmplt 5 Notice of Default by 7/30/2009 9/312009 
Northwest Trustee Services, 
Inc. dated July 23, 2009, with 
HSBC Bank USA, NA as 
Trustee for Wells Fargo Asset 
Securities Corp, Mortgage 
Pass-Through Certificates, 
Series 2007-4 ("Current 
Beneficiary") 
Mtd4 Notice of Default by 7/3012009 117/2010 
Northwest Trustee Services, 
Inc. dated July 23, 2009, with 
HSBC Bank USA, NA as 
Trustee for Wells Fargo Asset 
Securities Corp, Mortgage 
Pass-Through Certificates, 
Series 2007-4 ("Current 
Beneficiary") 
Cmplt 2 Residential Real Estate 
Contract dated 10/4/2009, 
Sellers: Carlylses 
Buyer: Bret Armacost 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 29 
Case 1 :10-cv-00274-EJL -LMB Document 19 Filed 02/09/11 Page 30 of 30 
Mtd5 Notice of Trustee's Sale dated 
10/912009 by Successor 
Trustee Northwest Trustees 
Services, Inc.; sale to be held 
2/8/2010 and 2/9/2010 
Cmplt 3 Warranty Deed conveying 12/7/2009 121812009 
property to Second Ventures 
West, Inc. executed by 
Carlyles 12/_/2009 
Cmplt 6 Notice of Trustee's Sale dated 
2/112010 by Successor Trustee 
Northwest Trustees Services, 
Inc.; sale to be held 6/3/2010 
and 6/412010 
Cmplt4 Warranty Deed conveying 6/112010 512112010 
property to Bret Armacost, 
executed by Donald Perry, 
President, Second Ventures 
West, Inc. On May 18,2010. 
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